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Introduction

When describing the imperial crisis of 1763-1776 between the British government and
the American colonists, historians often refer to Great Britain as a united entity unto itself, a
single character in the imperial conflict. While this offers rhetorical benefits, it oversimplifies the
complex constitutional relationship between the American periphery and the British center.
Instead, the path to independence is a story of how Americans rejected the authority of each part
of the central British government in turn. Americans drew a clear distinction between protesting
the authority of the British Parliament and that of King George III himself.
Rather than recalling the nature of their protest against the British ministry or Parliament,
a deeper understanding of why Americans rejected the authority of the British monarchy may
explain why a disagreement concerning the imperial constitution became a struggle for American
independence. Americans, especially educated elites, understood the complexity of the British
government and allowed it to shape the language of their protest. First, they objected to the
arbitrary authority of Parliament and later the oppressive actions of the British ministry.
Nevertheless, they maintained their respect and affection for George III until his failure to
restrain his government’s oppressive policies caused them to reject his authority as well. Having
then severed all constitutional connections with Great Britain, independence came as a natural
consequence. Therefore, understanding why Americans rejected the authority of the British
monarch may help to explain the purpose of America’s founding.
Throughout the twentieth century, historians have offered several interpretations of the
causes of the imperial crisis that led to independence. Most historians have argued that the
Revolution arose out of either economic or political causes. The Progressive School, which
dominated the historical discipline in America from the 1910s to the 1930s, tended to emphasize
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the economic aspects of the conflict with Great Britain. Many Progressive historians developed
their skills in a time when the dominant political movement protested class inequalities in the
American economic system as well as corruption in the government. In their interpretation, then,
the American Revolution was primarily a social movement, which arose out of class struggles
inherent in the British system.
Charles Beard was one of the most influential historians of this time. Under his
interpretation, economic forces were central to the American Revolution. The elites of society,
he argued, acted out of self-interest rather than republican virtue. His An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States argued that the Constitution represented
the triumph of elites who had made it their goal to guide the Revolution to their own advantage.1
Carl Lotus Becker also influenced Progressive historiography. He argued that there were
“two general movements” at work in the American Revolution. 2 The first was a political and
military conflict between the colonies and Great Britain. The second, larger movement included
the “democratization of American politics and society.” 3 In both movements, Becker’s focus
remained on economic causation. The political actions of Parliament, he argued, affected each
social class differently and caused conflict not only with Parliament but also within the colonies. 4
The Neo-Consensus School revised their predecessor’s arguments in the late 1940s and
1950s. Finding their nation a new world power, pitted against the expanding Soviet Union,
American historians sought to distance their nation’s origins from the radical Bolshevik
Revolution, which birthed their communist enemies. In line with this goal, their research focused
1

Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1998), xxxi, 18. See also a description of Beard’s work in Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of
the Republic, 1763-1789 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 131-132.
2
Carl Lotus Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York,1760-1776 (Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 5.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 56-58. For another example from the Progressive School, see J. Franklin Jameson, The American
Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).

3
on the political features of American independence and the experience of the elites rather than
economic struggles between social classes. Edmund S. Morgan articulated the claims of many
Neo-Consensus historians by arguing that the American Revolution represents the “history of the
American’s search” for political principles that guided the new nation.5 The influence of NeoConsensus historians remains prominent. Jack P. Greene’s most recent work argued that the
American Revolution was “the unintended consequence of a dispute about law.” 6 For Greene,
the primary causes of American independence did not rest in a social uprising or a fundamental
disagreement concerning human rights. Instead, it was a constitutional struggle, the consequence
of a dispute about which part of the English government should hold power in the colonies.
Arising in the 1960s, the Neo-Whig School also focused on political and ideological
causes of American independence, but they modified the Neo-Consensus view by giving greater
agency to non-elite groups and emphasizing the radical nature of patriot politics. With an focus
on understanding the past in terms of its own culture, they consider the Revolution based on
eighteenth-century perceptions. Bernard Bailyn launched this school of thought in his
monumental work, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. He argued that the
“ultimate origins” of political philosophy in America came from the “radical social and political
thought of the English Civil War and of the Commonwealth period.” 7 The “radicalism the
Americans conveyed to the world,” he insisted, transformed the relationship of the colonies to
5
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Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens, GA: University of George Press, 1986) for
a similar interpretation of the causes of the imperial crisis.
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Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992), 34. Bailyn came to this conclusion by tracing the thought of philosophers, political
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thought (v, 34).
6
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their mother country.8
Pauline Maier offered a major contribution to the Neo-Whig School. Her work continued
the theme of a focus on politics, but she expanded Bailyn’s interpretation beyond the educated
elite of America. She insisted that “no leader, not even the most outspoken American partisan,
was anti-British” at the beginning of the imperial crisis, but a “confluence of events” throughout
the empire convinced Americans that “a plot was afoot against freedom.” 9
Maier’s work warrants special focus here, because it is especially relevant to the
relationship of American colonists with the British monarchy. While the majority of her work
gave agency to Great Britain as a uniform political unit, in later chapters Maier made a
compelling distinction between American protest of Parliament and of the king. She rightly
identified that at first Americans did not implicate the king in the perceived conspiracy against
American freedom. They instead blamed the British ministry and Parliament and insisted that
individuals from these bodies were deceiving the king, blinding him from the sufferings of his
loyal American subjects. The king finally became “implicated in his ministers’ policies when a
petition movement of late 1769 and 1770 failed to “win the King’s support.”10
Maier’s now forty-year-old assertions remain relevant. The notion that colonists believed
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Ibid., 161.
Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Knopf, 1972), xii, xvii.
Gordon Wood also expanded the focus of the Neo-Whig School to not only the radical politics of the
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Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 203, 208. See chapter 6, “The International Sons of Liberty and
the Ministerial Plot, 1768-1770” and chapter 7, “The Implication of the King, 1770-1772” for Maier’s arguments
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the actions of Parliament and the British ministry amounted to a conscious effort to subject
Americans to slavery is well established among historians. 11 Nevertheless, Maier’s research has
some limitations. Her focus is on the voice of the common people – in her case, the actions of the
Sons of Liberty – at the expense of more elite Americans’ point of view, and she does not
explain the subtle motivations of different groups and individuals in British America.
These three major schools of thought contributed to a deeper understanding of the causes
of American independence by exploring the economic and political motivations of both elite and
common Americans. Nevertheless, there may have been a third component that none of these
schools have explored fully. While political and economic injustice no doubt motivated
Americans’ actions, the power of emotion in the imperial crisis may have driven Americans to
action more than any other influence. This was especially true concerning the relationship
between different groups of Americans and the British monarch. Indeed, Americans related to
their king in a much more emotional way than they did with any other part of the British
government.
In The King’s Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776, Brendan
McConville began to explore the role of emotions in American independence. 12 His work began
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Maier wrote in her introduction to the 1991 reprinting of this work that “the argument in From
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Within the past five years, other historians have examined the prominence of emotion in the American
Revolution as well. Nicole Eustace argued that emotion played a major part not only in the Revolution itself, but in
“the reordering of Anglo-American life.” Nicole Eustace, “Passion is the Gale:” Emotion, Power, and the Coming
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by challenging the established understanding of the nature of the political culture of eighteenthcentury America. Historians, he contended, have always imagined Americans before 1776 as
potential republicans constantly engaged in becoming what they are today. 13 Instead, McConville
argued that the political culture of colonial America between the Glorious Revolution of 1688
and American independence in 1776 “was decidedly monarchical and imperial.” 14 Furthermore,
it remained so “almost to the moment of American independence” when in the space of one or
two years the legitimacy of royal authority abruptly collapsed in an outpouring of emotion due to
a misunderstanding concerning the king’s role in the empire’s political structure. 15
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, McConville argued for the devotion of most
Americans to Hanoverian kings in the eighteenth century by examining two parts of colonial life:
religion and material culture. A deep connection to their English past led Americans to view their
king as their Protestant protector, the bulwark against religious instability and Catholic
influence.16 British Americans expressed their love for the king in royal celebrations and political
holidays. Furthermore, the king’s image saturated colonial society. The symbols and images of
Hanoverian rulers appeared on mugs, coins, portraits in homes, and many other commodities.
Monarchy, McConville argued, was a powerfully emotional part of everyday life in British
America.

of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 15. Likewise, Sarah
Knott argued that sensibility, what she calls a “distinctive mode of self,” was a major part of the American
Revolution. As colonial Americans transformed society, she argued, they were also transforming themselves. Sarah
Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 5.
An emphasis on emotion and sensibility in such studies and in McConville’s work may mark a rising trend in the
historiography of the American Revolutionary period.
13
McConville, The King’s Three Faces, 2-6. McConville contends that colonial Americans cultivated a
deep emotional tie to the British monarch, seeing him as their Protestant protector and benevolent father. When, he
wrote, “the weight of events . . . implicated George III, the political and emotional apparatus that maintained the
empire began to collapse in a rolling cascade that ended in sacrilege and iconoclasm.” Ibid., 249-250. See also
pages 106-113, 171-172, 245, and especially 250-266.
14
Ibid., 2-7.
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Ibid. 7, 249.
16
Ibid., 50, 82, 86, 112.
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Yet the cult of monarchy in America did not last. According to McConville, royal
authority collapsed not as an inevitable circumstance of a gradual decline in affection for the
king, but in a sudden, iconoclast outbreak of contempt. Americans’ rejection of George III was
so violent because the powerful emotions that had once bound Americans to their monarch
turned so suddenly against him. 17 Throughout the imperial crisis, he insisted, even the most
extreme activists did not wish to affect a separation from Britain but to “preserve what was” not
in an “American republic but a monarchical America firmly situated in a new constitution.” 18
Royal authority collapsed, though, because George III failed to restrain the abuse of Parliament
and his ministry. Thus, in the minds of Americans he became implicated in a plot to subject
British America to slavery.
McConville’s arguments are compelling, but he tended to treat various regions and
groups of people monolithically, failing to account for the changing motivations of individuals in
a variety of circumstances. While a bottom-up approach served him well, the voice of more
educated, elite groups of Americans played only a small role. He convincingly showed that
America was indeed monarchical throughout most of the eighteenth century, but within his
model, historians must explain exactly why various groups and individuals rejected the king they
had so fervently loved and followed for so many years.
Focusing on the experience of three elite groups in colonial America will help to fulfill
these arguments and uncover new and more nuanced motivations among Americans in very
different regions and circumstances. 19 First, the delegates of the Continental Congress were an
17

“At the end of empire, Americans engaged in an orgy of iconoclastic violence in the streets . . . swelling
love for the monarch become mistrust and then uncontrollable hatred expressed in the destruction of royal arms,
portraits, emblems, and most visibly, royal statues and effigies. Ibid., 306.
18
Ibid., 230.
19
Examining elites is enlightening for several reasons. Educated individuals tended to keep records of their
commonplace experience. This is valuable because it allows historians to make connections between Americans’
individualized experience and their political decisions. Elite Americans left behind an abundance of diaries and
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elite group of politicians who represented the whole of America. Their decisions and powerful
influence affected not only elites, but common Americans as well. Their writings, from their first
meeting in 1774 to their leadership in declaring collective independence from Great Britain in
1776, offers the most articulate explanation for Americans’ motivation in rejecting not only
parliamentary authority but eventually royal authority as well. Most delegates insisted on
maintaining their loyalty to King George III as they protested parliamentary authority, and this is
evident in the language of their many petitions and resolutions. In the year that passed between
the summer of 1775 through July 1776, though, more and more delegates began to change the
tone of their protest. The delegates of the Continental Congress finally rejected royal authority
because the speeches and proclamation of King George III convinced them that reconciliation
was impossible without the total subjection of American liberty.
Second, Southern planters were in a unique position because they experienced the
relational structure of hierarchy as an everyday part of their lives. Planters saw themselves as
kings over their little kingdoms, and large plantations were in many ways a microcosm of the
English empire’s monarchical structure. Planters implemented a bureaucratic structure to manage
their many slaves and collect regular reports on the progress of their agricultural and industrial
pursuits. Because planters often saw themselves as small kings, their relationship with slaves
informed their own relationship with the British monarch.
Planters understood that they were in a reciprocal – though inherently unequal –
relationship with their slaves in which they had a responsibility to care for slaves’ material needs
and protect them from the arbitrary power of their appointed overseers. Ideally, slaves enjoyed
an open channel of communication with their master in which they could complain of
letters that offer information on their motivations for these political decisions. Also, elites often held a position of
influence over common Americans. Examining their motivations might help to explain the actions of many other
Americans.
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mistreatment from the overseers who drove them. They expected the master to investigate their
complaints and correct the situation when necessary, and masters took great pride in providing
this service to their slaves. The writings of many planters suggest that as subjects of the British
monarch, they expected the same service from their king that they provided for their own
subordinates. Therefore, when King George III failed to address Americans’ many legitimate
complaints of ministerial corruption, they rejected his authority because he failed to fulfill the
responsibilities of a benevolent ruler.
Third, the political rhetoric of American ministers helps explain the experience of
educated religious Americans. Ministers also had a unique place in colonial America, because
they were perhaps the most influential of any of these three groups. They held influence over
their congregations and often published their sermons, which many Americans read voraciously,
who might not otherwise have picked up a political pamphlet. McConville wrote extensively on
how Americans viewed their king as a Protestant protector. Because Americans were so
“virulently anti-Catholic,”20 he wrote, the “emotional [tie] between the individual and ruler” was
dependent on the ultimate “defeat of Catholicism in England” after decades of religious and
political upheaval. 21 The post-Stuart monarchs were the symbols and protectors of this victory.
Colonial ministers, therefore, expected their ruler to fulfill the responsibility of that role by
supporting the influence of Protestantism throughout the world and protecting the English church
from Popish influence. The king’s failure to address American grievances concerning the
Quebec Act and his refusal to restrain a ministry that Americans believed had fallen under papal
influence led to their rejection of royal authority. Many ministers believed the king had failed as
their Protestant protector.

20
21

McConville, The King’s Three Faces, 7.
Ibid., 50.
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An important theme that arises in each case is the influence of individuals’ commonplace
experience on their political decisions. Americans acted based on the emotions that they derived
from their daily experience. This was certainly true of the politicians that made up the First and
Second Continental Congress. Emotion often guided their decisions and their communication
with the British government as they reacted to George III’s speeches and proclamations.
Southern planters interpreted their relationship with the king based on their role as fatherly
protectors of their slaves. American ministers reacted violently when they perceived that their
monarch had failed to secure their religious liberty. Using Scripture to interpret the king’s
actions, they aligned the once vigilant Protestant sentinel with some of ancient Israel’s most
degenerate kings. In each case, the interpretive framework of their unique experience defined
their perception of the king and formed their reaction to the extraordinary politics of the
American founding era.
Because their individualized experience was different, politicians, planters, and ministers
all had differing perceptions of the king’s role and the responsibilities that he needed to fulfill.
King George III relinquished his authority by failing to meet the requirements of these varying
roles. For the radical delegates of the Continental Congress, the king was a legitimate ruler
turned arbitrary tyrant. For Southern planters who embraced independence, he was an attentive
plantation father turned negligent slave driver. For many American patriot ministers, he was their
Protestant guardian turned Popish conciliator. Different groups had varying expectations of their
monarch, but when he failed to fulfill his responsibilities, the consequences were quite similar.
Ultimately, royal authority collapsed, because Americans became disillusioned with King
George III.
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Chapter 1:
“Great Britain May Thank Herself:”
King George III, Congressional Delegates, and American Independence, 1774-1776

In October 1774, the members of First Continental Congress issued a petition to King
George III recounting the grievances they had suffered under the illegitimate authority of
Parliament. Throughout the appeal, they constantly assured the king of their loyalty, insisting
that their hearts remained full of the “sentiments of duty to your majesty and affection to the
parent state.”1 They could not foresee, however, how quickly their affection and loyalty would
fade. Less than two years later, the Second Continental Congress would aggressively indict the
monarch for some of the same grievances in their Declaration of Independence. 2 The writings of
the delegates of the First and Second Continental Congress indicate a shift in focus marked by
the protest of parliamentary authority that, in time, evolved into a full rejection of royal
allegiance. This pronounced shift demands the attention of all historians of the American
Revolutionary period, because it helps to explain the reasoning of American politicians in their
decision to abolish all political ties to their mother country. In their minds, the only political
connection between Great Britain and the American colonies lay in submission to royal
authority. When the delegates began to protest not only parliamentary power but royal
prerogative as well, they severed the last remaining political connection to Britain and declared
independence not as a future objective but as a present circumstance.
Examining the nature of this shift will further explain the complexities of the events
leading to Congress’s decision for independence. Specifically, answering the questions of when

1

Continental Congress, “The Petition of the Grand American Continental Congress” (Boston, 1774), 7.
“The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all
having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.” Continental Congress, The
Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776 (Philadelphia: John Dunlap, 1776).
2
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and, more importantly, why this shift in focus occurred among the delegates of Congress may
help reveal the background of the decision for independence. The pamphlets, letters, notes, and
diaries of the delegates from August 1774 to July 1776 provide a guide to the experience of the
American political elite in the imperial conflict. 3 They trace the constitutional struggles that
members of Congress expressed concerning their connection to the king and Parliament. These
documents recount the delegates’ changing opinion of the crown, which led to independence in
July 1776. The delegates reacted to a series of speeches and proclamations from July 1775 to
March 1776,4 in which the king made known his punitive intentions for the American colonies.
These proclamations, along with other correspondence from England, convinced the majority of
delegates that George III would not accept reconciliation with Great Britain except under terms
of complete submission to the authority of king and Parliament. These events nurtured
increasingly passionate contempt for the crown among more and more members of Congress. 5
As the delegates of the First Continental Congress prepared to meet in September 1774,
they began to reiterate the arguments against parliamentary authority that had remained on
American lips and pens for nearly eleven years. The passage of the Coercive Acts earlier in 1774
had released a flurry of pamphlets and speeches aiming to renew the struggle. Two such
3

Focusing on this small body of individuals also helps to confine the parameters of the research.
Note that because of the slow nature of communication across the Atlantic Ocean any event that occurred
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Pauline Maier argued that the American people rejected royal authority when violence broke out in
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military advances caused this shift in the minds of the members of Congress. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution.
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narrow scope, though, the span of less than two years in the story, particular events and individual action become
much more significant. McConville, The King’s Three Faces, 7, 249.
4
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pamphlets, written by newly appointed delegates on the eve of the First Continental Congress,
summarized the view of most delegates.
Thomas Jefferson’s “A Summary View of the Rights of British America” passionately
outlined Parliament’s encroachments on American liberties. He listed the many crimes of
Parliament against America including the cruel acts to punish Boston, but he reminded his
readers that “[t]he true ground on which we declare these acts void is,” not the acts’ cruelty, but
that Parliament had no authority to bind Americans in any case. 6 He argued that Parliament had
no legitimacy in America, because the colonists had no representation there. He continued:
Not only the principles of common sense, but the feelings of human nature, must be
surrendered up before his majesty’s subjects here can be persuaded to believe that they
hold their political existence at the will of a British parliament. Shall these governments
be dissolved, their property annihilated and their people reduced to a state of nature, at
the imperious breath of a body of men, whom they never saw, in whom they never
confided, and over whom they have no powers of punishment or removal . . . ?7
Not only did these words articulate the constitutional struggle at work, but they also reveal that
the dispute evoked the deepest emotions of even the most enlightened men of the time, emotions
that became a motivating factor for the members of Congress.
In quite a different pamphlet published in the same month, James Wilson offered a more
detailed explanation for the rejection of parliamentary authority over internal affairs in the
colonies.8 Referring to more than the inherent injustice of the situation, Wilson made the case for
the legal and constitutional illegitimacy of recent acts of Parliament. The grievances that he
listed found their origins in “the principles . . . of the British constitution.” 9 He reminded his

6

Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America” (Williamsburg: Rind, 1774), 11.
Ibid., 12.
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James Wilson, “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament” (Philadelphia, 1774), 2.
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readers of the precedents that applied in this dispute.10 One of the most important principles of
the English constitution was that no man should pay taxes without his consent. Because taxes
were necessary to maintain the nation, the House of Commons came into being as a way for the
people to give consent to taxation and other policies.11
Wilson examined every avenue in the constitution that would justify parliamentary
authority in America. He concluded that there could be no reason in line with the British
constitution that the laws of Parliament should bind Americans other than that they were
represented in that body and therefore able to give their consent. 12 He cited a precedent to
strengthen his argument. After the conquest of Ireland, British judges decided that the statutes of
British legislative bodies could not bind the Irish people “because they do not send Knights
[representatives] to Parliament.”13 Instead, they were subject to the king only. In the same way,
parliamentary jurisdiction could not extend over the American colonies because they had no
representation in that body. 14
Still, there was a provision concerning Ireland that British policymakers sought to apply
as a justification for their authority in America. Parliamentary statutes could bind the Irish people
in specific cases if the statute expressly named them. Yet, Wilson observed that British judges
explicitly stated that this provision only applied to conquered lands such as Ireland. Wilson
argued, therefore, that this precedent could not apply to America because they did not enter the
English Empire by conquest but by colonization. The people of America then were entitled to the

10

The British constitution does not exist as a written document as it does in the American system. The
British constitution refers to a loose collection of precedents and long-held principles that both legitimized and
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Ibid., 15.
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Ibid., 20.
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same rights as all Englishmen. 15
The Wilson and Jefferson pamphlets began to circulate less than one month before the
first meeting of Congress. Perhaps some of the delegates, wearied from their journeys, read these
words as they arrived in Philadelphia. In any case, the same thoughts gripped the minds of these
men as expressed even in their earliest correspondence before the meetings began in September.
Some articulated their optimism that the Congress would be a success. John Adams recorded the
sentiment of Richard Henry Lee that the representatives should call for the repeal of the
Intolerable Acts and alter the Massachusetts Constitution.16 At a dinner party with several of the
delegates who had already arrived in Philadelphia by 3 September, Adams recounted that Lee
seemed “absolutely certain, that the Ship which carries home the Resolution will bring back the
Redress.”17 Lee no doubt based his assumption on the effectiveness of past American action
against other parliamentary legislation, but he could not have grasped how complicated AngloAmerican relations had become by 1774.
Addressing parliamentary action against Massachusetts was the first order of business for
Congress as they began to debate the authority of Parliament over the colonies. Adams was vocal
in arguing that the lawmaking power over the colonies resided only in the local legislatures.
James Duane, a New York delegate, confirmed Adams’s argument, adding that the charters for
the colonies “are Compacts between the Crown and the People.”18 The crown then was solely
responsible for the political existence of the colonies, and Parliament had no constitutional right
to make laws for the American people. On this ground Adams asserted that the rights of British
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Ibid., 24-25.
Richard Henry Lee served as a Virginia delegate to both the First and Second Continental Congress. He
is famous for proposing the resolution for American independence in June 1776.
17
Diary of John Adams, 3 September 1774 in Paul E. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 17741789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1978), 1:7 (hereafter LDC).
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America could be “reduce[d] . . . to one. All the Acts of Parliament made since . . . the
Emigration of our Ancestors . . . are violations of our Rights.”19 These proceedings would
eventually provide the voice of the final resolves of the First Continental Congress. In these
resolves, they argued that, because they did not and could not enjoy proper representation in
Parliament, they could not lawfully accept the authority of that body. Instead, they retained the
right to tax themselves by the authority of their own local legislative bodies. 20
By the second day of Congress, the delegates had resolved to appoint a committee to
“state the Rights of the Colonies, the several Instances in which they have been violated &
infringed and the means most proper to obtain Redress.”21 The proceedings of this committee
largely concerned the question of whether Parliament had the right to regulate external trade in
the British Empire. James Duane proposed that the committee concede this right to Parliament
but warned that they must be careful “to establish a Principle upon which we can submit this
Authority to Parliament without the Danger of . . . their pleading a Right to bind [the colonies] in
all Cases whatsoever.”22 Several committee members including Adams and John Dickinson of
Pennsylvania were ready to relinquish this right to Parliament, but others remained adamantly
opposed. Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina for example remained “violent against allowing
Parliament any Power of regulating Trade, or allowing that they have any Thing to do with
Us.”23 Gadsden argued that Parliament had already abused this power to lay taxes on the
American colonies and they would do it again. “A Right of regulating Trade,” he said, “is a
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Right of Legislation, and a Right of Legislation in one Case, is a Right in all.” 24
These deliberations in the Committee on Rights spilled over into the general assembly of
delegates over the debate of Joseph Galloway’s Plan of Union. 25 A major concern of the debate
concentrated on which political body should hold the right to regulate trade within the empire. It
was apparent that individual legislatures in the colonies did not possess the jurisdiction or the
means to regulate trade in the entire empire. Adams, Duane, and others put forth their arguments
that they could allow this power to stay in the hands of Parliament while barring their authority
to tax the colonies or regulate internal affairs. Echoing Gadsden, others objected, saying that
“Parliament and Ministry is wicked, and corrupt and will take Advantage of such Declarations to
tax us – and will also Reason from this Acknowledgment, to further Power over us.” 26 Galloway
offered a compromise. He argued Congress to recommend the creation of a new legislative body
made up of representatives from all the British colonies that would have the power to regulate
trade within the empire. 27
In the end, Galloway failed to push his plan through Congress. Adams and Dickinson’s
persuasion won on this issue, and Congress resolved to concede the right to regulate commerce
outside of the North American colonies to Parliament in order to ensure that all members of the
English Empire received the benefits of this exchange. 28 Careful to ensure that the wording did
not betray any hint of conciliation to the authority of Parliament, Congress added that they
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conceded this right only because of “the necessity of the case.” 29
Through all this, it is important to note that the delegates of the First Continental
Congress were not interested in independence from Great Britain. They were mainly interested in
achieving a repeal of the Intolerable Acts and a definite acknowledgment that Parliament had no
authority to tax American colonies. Wilson carefully reminded his readers that a denial of the
authority of Parliament did not mean a denial of any political connection between America and
Britain.30 In the same way, Duane insisted that the foremost goal of the Congress should be a
“firm Union between the Parent State and her Colonies.”31
Nevertheless, the events of April 1775 complicated the matter. One would think that the
outbreak of war would threaten the delegates’ loyalty to the king and commitment to
reconciliation. Yet, the letters and diaries of several delegates indicate that even after hostilities
broke out in Lexington and Concord, they continued to seek reconciliation and affirm their
allegiance to the king. The Second Continental Congress issued a declaration in July 1775 in
order to explain their reasons for raising an army. Although they were committing to armed
resistance to the British government, they insisted that Congress had not “raised armies with
ambitious designs of separating from Great-Britain and establishing independent states.”32 This
sentiment was evident in the proceedings in Congress as well. In a debate over a resolution to
raise an army in support of Massachusetts, John Rutledge of South Carolina insisted that the
29
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purpose of such an army be clear. He asked the question that must have been on the minds of
others in the room. By raising an army against their own government, were they not declaring
independence?33 Adams was careful to reassure him that they were not aiming at total
independence: “. . . independence on Parliament is absolutely to be averrd in the Americans [sic],
but a de-pendence on the Crown is what We own.”34 Adams made an important distinction here.
The delegates of Congress fought to establish their independence from Parliament, but they did
not intend to deny their dependence on the crown. At least in the minds of the delegates, war did
not constitute a break with the British government. The American colonies remained firmly
connected to the British Empire through their affection and commitment to the king.
This sentiment came from a profound loyalty to the crown. Wilson’s pamphlet explained
the constitutional background for their allegiance. When settlers came to America from Britain,
they took the land in the name of the king by his authority. He granted them royal charters
without the input of Parliament. According to Wilson, they did not consider themselves subjects
of Parliament, but only of the king. 35 Duane also confirmed Wilson’s observation, writing
Americans owe the king their allegiance no less than his subjects in England. 36 Their persistent
loyalty led many delegates to continue to advocate for reconciliation.
After April 1775, the Second Continental Congress continued to maintain their loyalty. In
perhaps one of the best examples of this observation, the North Carolina delegates expressed
their devotion to the king in a circular letter sent to the committees in North Carolina. They
insisted that their constituents consider George III as their “rightful . . . Sovereign” and that they
“dare every danger and difficulty in support of his person . . . and consider every man as a traitor
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to his King, who . . . attempts to invade those glorious revolution principles which placed him on
the throne . . . .”37 Even in the midst of war with the king’s troops, these delegates insisted that
they did not act out of contempt for royal authority but against traitors to his majesty. John
Dickinson called for the raising of troops, and, in the same breath, he also promoted a petition
that would express their loyalty to the king. 38 In John Jay’s draft of the proposed petition, he
expressed their loyalty even in the face of disappointment at the king’s reactions to their previous
petitions and complaints.39
It is peculiar that Congress chose to send their petitions to the king for the redress of
abusive acts of Parliament. The First and Second Continental Congress sent petitions to the
crown, addresses to the people of England and the people of Ireland, a letter to the mayor of
London, a dispatch to the Assembly of Jamaica, and many other addresses expressing their
grievances and asking for assistance. 40 Nevertheless, they never found it useful even to discuss
writing a petition to Parliament although that body was the source of the conflict. Instead, they
repeatedly recommended petitioning the king with a list of grievances that had befallen the
colonies as a result of Parliament’s cruelties. 41 It may have been more effective to convince
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Parliament of the illegality of their actions. Perhaps a petition to that body would appear as a
submission to its authority. Rather than addressing Parliament, they chose to speak to the king, as
he embodied their political connection to Great Britain.
Congress also chose to address the king in their petitions, because they saw him as their
mediator and protector. Jefferson called for their royal mediator to intercede on their behalf in a
passionate plea: “. . . and we do earnestly entreat his majesty, as yet the only mediatory power
between the several states of the British Empire, to recommend to his parliament of Great Britain
the total revocation of these acts.”42 Such language was present in the debates in Congress as
well. Virginia delegate Edmund Pendleton proposed that they ask the crown in their petition to
“interpose his Roial [sic] Influence for Opening a treaty of Accommodation between his Subjects
there & here . . . .”43 But they perceived George III as more than a mediator. They thought of him
as their father and protector. In John Jay’s draft, the language appealed to familial affection
between the crown and the colonies as between father and child.44 Before and after Lexington
and Concord, they called to their father for protection from their parliamentary oppressors.
At times, though, the executive branch of the English government was plainly to blame
for some of the grievances that the colonists suffered. In these cases, the delegates used careful
language to implicate the royal ministers rather than the king himself. In the resolves of the First
Continental Congress, they blamed the king’s counselors for ignoring their repeated petitions as
if they withheld their protestations from the king. 45 In their mind, if the wicked ministers had not
hidden the condition of his majesty’s subjects, the king would certainly have acted swiftly for
42

Ibid., 16.
Edmund Pendleton’s Proposed Resolutions, 24-26 May 1775 in Smith, LDC, 1:404.
44
“That reposing the utmost Confidence in the paternal Care of their Prince and the Justice of the British
Nation they were urged by the perilous Situations of the Liberties to solicit his Majesty’s Attention by their late
Petition to their real & unmerited Greivances [sic], and to request his royal interposition on their behalf.” John Jay’s
Draft Petition to the King, 3-19? June 1775 in ibid., 1:440.
45
Continental Congress, “Declaration and Resolves” in Greene, Colonies to Nation, 244.
43

22
their protection. This image of corrupt advisers was a motif in Jefferson’s pamphlet, which urged
his majesty to reject his ministers’ advice and “to think and to act for [himself] and [his]
people.”46 At the beginning of the meeting of the First Continental Congress, Richard Henry Lee
argued that they should advise his majesty to dismiss his corrupt counselors. Without their
influence, they believed, the protector would hear their grievances and act quickly in their
favor.47 Benjamin Harrison of Virginia was more direct and personal in his tones, calling for “a
constitutional Death to the Lords Bute, Mansfield and North.” 48
Because the king maintained control of the British army in America, it would seem
reasonable to condemn the king once sustained fighting broke out in April 1775. Nevertheless,
the delegates continued to avoid reference to George III himself in relation to military affairs.
They instead blamed his ministers and maintained their constitutional ties with the king. Samuel
Ward referred to British soldiers as “ministerial Troops” avoiding their customary designation as
the king’s troops.49 The North Carolina delegates also avoided the king’s name in connection
with the military clashes in Massachusetts. Instead, they repeatedly referred to the first minister,
Lord North.50 Thomas Cushing, writing to John Dickinson when a military clash seemed eminent
in his home colony of Massachusetts, also avoided connecting the king to the crisis. “You may
rest assured,” he wrote,” that they [Massachusetts] never will assume Government unless the
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Ministry should determine and Execute the late Acts by a Military force . . . .”51 The delegates’
word choices indicate that they did not consider the monarch responsible for military action
against America.
Even when they directly referred to George III’s actions, most delegates were careful
only to use the word “ministry” in the king’s place. In reference to the king’s aggressive speech
at the opening of Parliament in November 1774, Richard Henry Lee wrote, “The wicked
violence of Ministry is so clearly expressed, as to leave no doubt of their fatal determination to
ruin both Countries.”52 He wrote as if they should not hold George III himself responsible for his
own words, because he spoke under the guidance of his wicked ministers. An unknown delegate
gave a speech in the early days of the Second Continental Congress accusing the royal ministers
of duplicitous actions. At first, it seemed that the petition of the First Continental Congress
would receive due consideration. Nevertheless, soon after this promise, a private letter from the
Secretary of State of England declared “the Congress illegal,” and Americans’ grievances
“pretended.”53 Still, the unknown delegate never held the king himself responsible for these
actions. In fact, he went out of his way to indict Parliament for being “prepared to support every
one of their [the ministry’s] measures,” 54 He criticized both Parliament and the ministers, but the
question never arose whether George III supported or originated any of these measures.
The delegates maintained their loyalty to the king even when it had already become clear
that he had chosen a path of war with the colonies. They continued to see him as their father and
protector. Wilson articulated this point while giving reasons for the colonists’ continued loyalty
to the king. He argued that “the Colonists ought to be dependent on the King, because they have
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hitherto enjoyed, and still continue to enjoy his protection.” 55 The delegates repeatedly appealed
to this principle in their petitions to the king. By July 1775, the promise of protection seemed to
be the last remaining support for continued loyalty to the monarchy.
In hindsight, it seems absurd to think of the king as a protector while he was actively
waging war. But for the American delegates, it seems that words spoke louder than actions. A
series of public statements from George III between September 1775 and March 1776 effectively
declared the colonies outside of his protection. With each offense, more and more delegates held
the crown in deeper contempt, eroding the bonds of affection that held the empire together. It
was the king’s words in the following months that severed this last remaining bond and set the
majority of the delegates on a course for independence.
In mid-September 1775, Congress received word that the people of London along with
the mayor had written a petition to the king in July respectfully entreating him to desist from the
use of military force against the American colonies.56 George III quickly answered the people of
London, saying that he was determined to continue in his present course as long as there
remained any resistance in America. 57 His words inspired the first instances of direct criticism
among the delegates.58 Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut observed that “By the last accounts from
England it appears the K[in]g is Obstinately bent to prosecute the Warr against Americans.”59
John Adams also showed his contempt for the king. With biting sarcasm, he referred to the
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king’s answer to the London petition as “Proof of his Clemency.” 60 The king’s answer put the
two sides at an impasse. If his majesty succeeded in his goals, congressional radicals believed
they faced total subjection. Samuel Ward made this observation in a letter to George Washington
in September 1775.61 Ward observed that that diplomatic avenues would likely be insufficient to
establish American liberties. This truth put more pressure on Washington as military affairs
became increasingly more important by September 1775.
Other delegates expressed their irritation over the king’s words, but they displayed a
somewhat more forgiving attitude. Robert Livingston did not refrain from directly criticizing the
king, but chose to employ milder language: “Their [sic] does not seem to be any great
appearance of relaxation in his answer,” he wrote.62 He expressed the importance of the
relationship of the colonies to their king along with his fear that “his majesty plays too
carelessly.” Another delegate from Virginia believed there was still hope for reconciliation
despite the king’s answer to the people of London.63 The king’s words eroded the loyalty of the
delegates. For the first time, they openly criticized George III rather than blaming his ministers.
It is possible that ideas of independence began to form in some of their minds as a result of this
event, but their letters do not record this sentiment. Reconciliation was still within grasp for the
majority of the delegates, but their esteem for their father protector had begun to decline.
The delegates’ criticism of the king became both more intense and more formal as a
result of a proclamation from the king only two months after his answer to the London petition.
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In August 1775, George III issued “A Proclamation For suppressing Rebellion and Sedition.” 64
This proclamation declared the American colonies to be in “open and avowed” rebellion and
called on loyalists and royal officers to suppress any instance of rebellion and bring traitors to
justice. 65 The king’s punitive words made a personal attack on the members of Congress. The
king believed that his subjects in North America were “misled by dangerous and ill-designing
Men.”66 He also insisted that these men had forgotten “the Allegiance which they owe to the
Power that has protected and sustained them.” 67 Many delegates found this deeply offensive.
They had taken care to express their allegiance to the crown in all their correspondence and even
encouraged their constituents to oppose any seditious words against the king. 68
The king’s use of the word “avowed” in describing their rebellion was also contrary to
the delegates’ writings. They had sent repeated petitions explaining their desire for
reconciliation. In another attack on the delegates, the monarch insisted that “such Rebellion hath
been much promoted and encouraged by the traitorous Correspondence, Counsels, and Comfort
of divers wicked and desperate Persons within this Realm . . . .”69 The king’s proclamation
demonstrated his view of Americans in general and the Continental Congress in particular.
From the viewpoint of the congressional delegates, it is no wonder that the king’s words
amplified their contempt and inspired both formal and private criticism. When the news came to
America in late October, it changed the opinions of many delegates. Samuel Ward observed that
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the proclamation “declared” them all “to be Rebels in effect tho not in express Terms.” 70 Rather
than discouraging him, the accusation relieved Ward because he knew that the king’s words
would produce “a most happy Effect here for those who hoped for Redress from our Petitions
now give them up & heartily join with us in carrying on the War vigorously.” 71 Ward had
evidently been moving away from reconciliation for some time, but the August Proclamation
brought several delegates to his side. This proclamation only served to harden American
resistance and created a growing movement in Congress to abandon reconciliation and oppose
not only parliamentary authority but royal allegiance as well.
Reconciliation no longer seemed possible for many delegates. In Ward’s understanding,
the king had convinced many moderates that they had been “pursuing a Phantom and that their
only Safety is a vigorous determin[e]d Defence.”72 He even gave an example of one of his fellow
delegate’s confession of such a change of heart.73 The arrival of the Proclamation was a critical
moment for the delegates. Joseph Hewes of North Carolina remarked that the ships that brought
the Proclamation brought few letters from their friends in England. It was almost as if the
Proclamation, he thought, deterred them from writing anything concerning politics, speaking to
the importance of the Proclamation in the delegates’ minds. 74
Out of these proceedings, Congress’s activity in the war again became more important as
diplomatic avenues became more strained. Nevertheless, a significant group of delegates
continued to desire reconciliation. In another letter, Ward lamented the disunity in Congress
concerning the war. Many delegates were apprehensive to approve aggressive actions for fear of
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ultimately alienating the king. Congress could have done much more, Ward argued, if they had
supported the war from the beginning “with vigor.”75 Yet, by summer of 1776, most of the
delegates would join Ward’s persuasion. More delegates would abandon reconciliation as events
unfolded. Support for the war grew as Americans’ relationship with the crown continued to
deteriorate.
The Continental Congress formally criticized the crown’s words in a Resolution
published on 6 December 1775. They sought to plead the innocence of the colonies and avoid the
punishment that they believed would be unjust. In this resolution, Congress challenged several of
the monarch’s assumptions. Most notably, they took offense to the accusation that they had
forgotten the allegiance, which they owed to the “power that has protected and sustained us.”76
Congress believed the king was intentionally vague with his language on this point. The
statement does not specify exactly to whom they owed this allegiance. The resolution repeated
that they never owed that allegiance to Parliament. American politicians had been arguing this
point for most of the past twelve years and especially in the preceding year. As for their
allegiance to the king, they claimed “Our words have ever avowed it – our conduct has ever been
consistent with it.”77 It is true that their official correspondence with king and others had been
consistently loyal to the crown. They denied any desire to declare independence and were careful
to avoid all criticism of George III himself. Yet, from the perspective of the king and the rest of
the British government, their actions may not have been consistent with their words. Yet, in the
minds of the delegates, they were blameless, and the king’s accusations were unjustified.
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The delegates also criticized the king for his vague use of the word “rebellion.” The
proclamation called for royal officials and other loyal Americans to bring anyone in rebellion to
just punishment. But Congress argued that there was no legal definition for who was in rebellion
or not. Therefore, royal officials might apprehend anyone they pleased. This infusion of power in
the hands of British officials appeared to the delegates as another step in establishing tyranny
over the American colonies. In order to prevent this unjust punishment, Congress pledged to do
everything in its power to retaliate against any person or group who persecuted American
patriots.78 Their conclusion is quite significant. Not only did the delegates directly criticize the
king, but they pledged to oppose his instructions by whatever means at their disposal. Their
words mark a shift in the Congress’s relationship with their monarch. Reconciliation by any
acceptable means seemed increasingly unlikely.
The August Proclamation remained on the minds of the delegates many months later. On
15 May 1776, Congress issued a resolution recommending that each of the colonies establish
new governments for themselves. Its preamble was the subject of much debate in Congress. It
stated the reasoning for the recommendation: “Whereas his Britannic Majesty, in conjunction
with the Lords and Commons of Great-Britain, has, by a late Act of Parliament, excluded the
inhabitants of these United Colonies from the protection of his crown . . . .”79 In the delegates’
viewpoint, this statement constituted the spirit of the August Proclamation. In declaring the
colonies to be in open rebellion, he also declared them outside of his protection. Royal
protection, as Wilson pointed out, was the basis for colonial affection and allegiance to the
crown.80 In the absence of his protection, the delegates concluded that remaining under British
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government “appear[ed] absolutely irreconcileable [sic] to reason and good conscience” and that
the “authority under the said Crown should be totally suppressed . . . .”81 By this time, the king’s
words had already driven them to recommend that the colonies tear down royal government
within their individual jurisdictions.
The August Proclamation also had profound implications for the Declaration of
Independence, which came less than two months after Congress’s 15 May resolution. John
Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and other radicals constitutionally justified a break from their
dependence on the crown because, though they had once “been bound to [the crown] by
allegiance . . . this bond was now dissolved by his assent to the late act of parliament, by which
he declares us out of his protection.” 82 The radicals included more legal justification for
independence in their argument, claiming that “allegiance and protection are reciprocal, the one
ceasing when the other is withdrawn.”83 It was not even necessary for Congress to manufacture
their independence from the king, because he had given them up by his own words. Congress
cited the Proclamation in the Declaration of Independence as well. They protested the monarch’s
action of “abdicat[ing] government here by declaring us out of his protection.”84 Besides its
obvious constitutional implications, this action had a deeply personal significance for many
Americans. It contributed to a bitter sense of betrayal on the part of the king, who had a duty to
protect American liberty. This betrayal corroded the delegate’s opinion of the crown and moved
them closer to independence. The Proclamation may have been all that was necessary to erode
fully American confidence in royal authority, but several other offenses from George III also
motivated this change in many delegates’ minds.
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In some ways, the king revealed his attitude passively rather than actively. The crown,
viewing the Continental Congress as an extralegal assembly, refused to receive its delegates or
its petitions. This inspired frustration among many delegates, as they felt disrespected. John
Hancock expressed his irritation at the king’s silence, concluding that the delegates would never
receive an answer to their grievances. 85 Samuel Adams predicted that the conflict would only
become more intense as Congress’s petitions had “been treated with insolent Contempt” in the
royal court. He called George III a tyrant who had closed his ears and his heart to the sufferings
of his people. 86 The king’s passivity inspired enough contempt to include it as a grievance in the
Declaration of Independence as well. 87 Their emotions were strong enough on this point to move
them to accuse George III of tyranny: “A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act
which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.” 88 This is one of only two
instances in the Declaration in which the delegates referred to King George III as a tyrant. 89 This
speaks to the passion, anger, and sense of betrayal that the Congress experienced as a result of
the king’s inaction.
Letters from correspondents in England also helped to reform the delegates’ image of the
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king. Letters from friends and their own envoys described the monarch’s disposition toward the
Continental Congress and the American colonies. The accuracy of their portrayals is not at issue
here. Delegates effectively spoke and acted on the assumptions of their English correspondents
whether their information was accurate or not. Ward received a letter from an American in
England which reported that the crown was “unalterably determined let the Consequences be
what it would to compel the colonies to absolute Obedience.”90 This alleged quotation from the
king made its way into the writings of several delegates. Samuel Adams used these exact words
in a letter to another Massachusetts delegate, James Bowdoin, to describe the monarch’s
intentions. 91 Jefferson also referred to correspondents: “We are told and every thing proves it
true that he [the king] is the bitterest enemy we have.” 92
These letters inspired great contempt for the crown among the delegates. Holding both
the king and his ministers in disdain, Jefferson wrote that the whole royal court was actively
conspiring against them.93 Ward expressed a similar sentiment. He wrote that a “faithful & very
sensible Friend in England” told him that the king “out does Lord Mansfield himself in
Dissimulation & Lust for Power.”94 This marks an important change in the delegates’ words
concerning George III. Before August 1775, they generally limited their criticism to the royal
ministers, rarely portraying the king himself in an unfavorable light. At this time, those roles
reversed in the mind of many delegates. To them, the king expressed even more tyrannical
tendencies than his corrupt ministers. Ward wrote that the sovereign “is at the Head of the
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violent Measures pursued & planning.”95 In many delegates’ minds, royal ministers were no
longer the only ones to blame. The king himself took the lead role in their oppression.
Disdain for the king himself led delegates much closer to independence. Jefferson wrote
that independence “is now pressed upon us by the measures adopted as if they were afraid we
would not take it.”96 He believed that the actions of the king were practically insisting that they
embrace independence. He lamented the crown’s attitude, wishing that he would be more
conciliatory. Jefferson cared about the fate of his British brethren, but he refused to submit to
royal oppression.97 “Believe me dear Sir,” he continued:
there is not in the British empire a man who more cordially loves a Union with Gr.
Britain than I do. But by the god that made me I will cease to exist before I yield to a
connection on such terms as the British parliament propose and in this I think I speak the
sentiments of America.98
This emotional reaction speaks to the depth of Jefferson’s feelings of betrayal and contempt for
the king.
The delegates’ contempt only continued to rise in January 1776 when they received the
text of a speech that the king gave before Parliament on 26 October. George III insisted that the
Continental Congress had levied war against his majesty’s troops for the purpose of securing
independence.99 This was in direct defiance to every petition that the delegates had sent to the
king over the past sixteen months, and they naturally took offense at this accusation. 100 It was in
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reference to this offense that the radicals in Congress expressed their most heated and effective
scorn for the monarch and began a wholehearted turn toward independence. Ward wrote of the
October speech: “It is decisive; Every Man must now be convinced that under God our Safety
depends wholly upon a brave, wise and determined Resistance.” 101 The same delegate wrote to
his daughter: “Thus you see my Love your Daddy’s Sentiments are confirmed that the Savage
ever meant to make himself an absolute despotic Tyrant. May the Reward of his Hands &
wicked Heart be given to him.” 102 Francis Lightfoot Lee of Virginia also argued that the king’s
speech should make it certain to everyone that the king only intended violence and
suppression. 103 Samuel Adams blamed the crown as opposed to the ministry for the speech. He
argued that the king “is his own Minister – that he follows the Dictates of his own Heart. If so,
why should we cast the odium of distressing Mankind upon his Minions & Flatterers only. Guilt
must lie at his Door. Divine Vengeance will fall on his head . . . .”104 Here, Adams explicitly
rejected the common practice of criticizing royal ministers while avoiding the name of the
monarch himself.
Despite these radicals’ expressions, it is important to note that not all the delegates agreed
with these convictions in January 1776. Several delegates still believed reconciliation was
possible. A royal officer, Lord Drummond, came to Philadelphia hoping to convince as many
delegates as possible that reconciliation was still on the table. He claimed that George III had
authorized him to say that if America would cease hostilities, they would be free from
colonial treasury, and exercised “legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” Still, in the minds of the delegates, the
king was either mistaken or intentionally speaking falsehood for the purpose of propaganda. For more detail, see
ibid., 6:1.
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parliamentary action in taxation and in internal affairs, but Britain would regulate trade. Any
duties laid would contribute only to the colonies’ treasuries.105 Many delegates distrusted
Drummond’s claims, because they contradicted the king’s own words. But some believed him.
Dickinson proposed yet another “humble & dutiful Petition” to the crown, saying in explicit
terms that they did not intend to fight for independence.106 A committee drafted such a petition in
late January, but Congress never adopted it. Richard Smith noted that the address “was very
long, badly written and full against Independancy.”107 The majority of Congress did not wish to
close the door on the possibility of independence and the issue did not come to a debate again in
Congress. These events are significant, because they speak to a change in the minds of most
delegates toward independence as a truly viable option. Coincidentally, the text of the king’s
October speech arrived in America in the same week that Thomas Paine’s Common Sense began
to circulate throughout the American colonies. As the delegates began to orient themselves to
independence, so too did many others in the colonies.108
Leading up to the resolution of 15 May, the delegates became increasingly inclined
toward independence. Francis Lightfoot Lee considered the benefits that independence would
bring to American trade and surmised that the past several months had shown that Americans
were capable of supporting good self-government. He hoped that it could be possible to gain
reconciliation on terms that would maintain American freedom, but he did not believe that the
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king’s attitude would make it possible. 109 For Samuel Adams, the king was resolute. There
would be no reconciliation without the sacrifice of American liberties. Therefore, the choice was
between “Independence or Slavery.” 110 The delegates hotly debated the use of language that
tended toward independence in their resolutions. In March 1776, Richard Henry Lee moved that
Congress change the wording of a resolution concerning privateering. He wanted the preamble of
the resolution to read that the king was the “Author of our Miseries” rather than the ministry. 111
The opposition claimed the change was “effectually severing the King from Us forever.” The
radicals in Congress did not deny this point.112 Congress debated the resolution for four hours
and eventually put it off for another time.
The 15 May Resolution was the culmination of all of these proceedings. 113 It directly
challenged the authority of the king. John Adams called it “the most important Resolution, that
was taken in America.”114 One could even argue that it was in effect a declaration of
independence before the July Declaration, because it recommended that all the colonies “totally
suppress” any political connection to the crown and set up new governments. 115 It was a
necessary step toward independence and created a noticeable stir in the colonies. But the
delegates needed one last push from the king to begin their debate over a unified declaration of
independence.
That push came in the beginning of June when the delegates received word of the king’s
answer to a second London petition. On 22 March, the people of London along with the mayor
and other authorities, petitioned the king to stop hostilities in America. They cited the problems
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that the war caused for British commerce and the swelling national debt, but they also appealed
to fundamental American rights. They argued, “We humbly conceive that no people can be
bound to surrender their rights and liberties as a return for protection.” 116 The king was preparing
to send a large military force to America to invade New York in July. The people of London
implored the king to tell the colonists what he expected of them for reconciliation: “We humbly
and earnestly beseech your Majesty, that . . . those just and honourable terms, which your
Majesty . . . means to grant to the Colonies, may precede the dreadful operations of your
armament.”117 In essence, they asked the king to strive once more for reconciliation before he
came down on the American rebellion with the full might of the British Empire. Their monarch’s
response was notably terse, almost brusque. He would not engage in more diplomacy with his
rebellious colonies. Instead, he would continue with his plans until “the now existing rebellion is
at an end. To obtain these salutary purposes, I will invariably pursue the most proper and
effectual means.”118
The king’s answer to the second London petition caused an uproar in Congress. To most
delegates, the king’s answer was clear; their monarch was fully against any attempt at
reconciliation. Richard Henry Lee summarized the king’s words: “Force on his part &
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sub[mission] on ours is all he proposes.”119 The people of London had asked for the terms of
American reconciliation and, in the minds of the delegates, the king had given his “Tyrannic”
answer.120 Josiah Bartlett pointed out that “by his answer we see he will have absolute
submission or nothing.”121 The crown had finally made it explicit that the only course of action
available was total suppression of American liberty.
The incident also served to unite Congress toward independence providing the final
motivation for many moderate delegates. Robert Livingston noted that the king’s answer should
convince more delegates that reconciliation was impossible. It came at an opportune time, he
wrote, because the people were “very unfortunately divided.”122 Robert Morris provided an
account of his own conversion. Through all the events of the past year, he had “never lost hope
of reconciliation,” but the king’s answer changed his opinion. 123 He assured his correspondent
that a declaration of independence would soon be at hand.124 Only five days after the delegates
received this news, Richard Henry Lee proposed a resolution declaring the united colonies free
and independent states.125 The king’s words were fresh on the delegate’s minds as they
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proceeded to debate independence throughout the month of June. 126 George III had made his
intentions known and his words had a profound effect on the Continental Congress. By the
beginning of July, the majority of the delegates from each colony concluded that independence
was the only sure way to guarantee American liberty. The gradual erosion of royal authority had
met its end in July 1776.
Since 1763, the American colonists had actively protested the authority of Parliament.
They insisted on their independence from that body under British constitutional law, because
they had no representation in it. Yet, Americans continually remembered their allegiance to the
king. Through him, the American colonies remained firmly tied to the British Empire. The crown
established their charters and provided their protection. Beginning in August 1775, though, the
delegates of the Continental Congress, as elite politicians representing all of America, began to
question royal authority. It is remarkable how quickly their political ties unraveled. Less than a
year later, their questions would result in a complete, irrevocable break from the British
government. The British Empire and, indeed, the history of humanity would never be the same.
In the opinion of the delegates of the First and Second Continental Congress, Great
Britain was to blame for the break. Robert Morris expressed this sentiment best:
Great Britain may thank herself for this Event, for whatever might have been the original
designs of some Men in promoting the present Contest I am sure that America in general
never set out with any View or desire of establishing an Independent Empire. They have
been drove into it step by step with a reluctance on their part that has been manifested in
all their proceedings . . . .127
Seeking to throw off the bonds of Parliament, Americans suddenly found themselves absolved
from any political connection not only from Parliament but from the king to whom they had for
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so long been bound by allegiance and affection. From July 1775 to March 1776, George III
issued a series of speeches and proclamations that left the delegates with no other choice but
independence if they meant to secure American liberties. By his words and his deeds, King
George III undermined American affection for Great Britain and their allegiance to the crown.
Was independence an accident? Could reconciliation have been achieved? The delegates’ answer
to these questions seems evident. In their opinion, reconciliation was impossible unless the king
had chosen to deal with the American colonies with a more diplomatic and conciliatory attitude
in this crucial moment in American history.
As politicians and diplomats, the members of the Continental Congress based their
decisions on the words of George III and the actions British government. They constructed a
vision of the intentions of the British government based on the information they received from
Great Britain and reacted in the context of their responsibility as political leaders. When most
delegates determined that the king was unwaveringly dedicated to reduce Americans to slavery,
independence came as a natural consequence. Other Americans though, making decisions from
different information and in unique contexts, rejected royal authority at different times and for
different reasons. This truth is essential to understanding the political experience of another
influential group of Americans, southern planters.
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Chapter 2:
Master and Slave, King and Subject:
Southern Planters and the Fall of King George III

Southern planters in pre-revolutionary America experienced an illustration of monarchy
always before them. Hierarchy, with its complex system of obligation and protocol, was a given,
a daily part of their lives. More than a New England merchant, or a middling western farmer, or
any other American, they knew what it meant to hold the authority of a monarch. Thus, when
Congress began to protest the power of Parliament and eventually reject royal authority as well,
planters held a unique view. Like any other person in a time of upheaval, they interpreted
extraordinary change based on their everyday assumptions, but because their experience was
unique, their reaction was unique as well. Examining how planters understood the complex
relationship between master and slave on their little plantation kingdoms might help to explain
their view of the relationship between king and subject in the greater British Empire. Ultimately
for southern planters, embracing independence was not so much a rejection of monarchy as a
form of government as it was a personal rejection of King George III as their sovereign. He
himself failed to fulfill the obligations of a king to his subjects, obligations they had come to
expect through their experience of serving as a master to their slaves.
Many historians agree that planters saw themselves as monarchs and viewed their
plantation as a little kingdom within the larger framework of the British Empire. Robert Olwell
argued this point. Seeking to understand the relationship between “‘Kings & Slaves,’” in the
South Carolina low country, Olwell argued that each planter was a little king and “each
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plantation . . . a little kingdom within the kingdom.”1 This extended not only to the relationship
between the slave and master of the plantation but also that of children and wives to the
patriarchal father and husband.2 Rhys Isaac’s argued in, Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom:
Revolution and Rebellion on a Virginia Plantation as much by showing the Revolution’s effect
on Landon Carter’s plantation. Ultimately, every relationship on a southern plantation found its
basis in a mutually understood hierarchical structure. The prevalence of order on Carter’s
plantation, Isaac argued, depended on how all the players in Carter’s little kingdom understood
and respected this structure.3
That planters saw themselves as small kings pervades their diaries and letters. Henry
Laurens, a leading planter in South Carolina, believed his slaves viewed him as “their Father,
their Guardian, & Protector,” some of the same language that British subjects traditionally used
in reference to their king. 4 He referred to the manner “by which I govern my Plantation Negroes”
as “Laws” and compared them to the laws of parliament and the actions of the British ministry. 5
Landon Carter, took notice of the death of a pet “canary bird” believing that even the smallest
creature “under my care and protection deserves a Small remembrance.” 6 Carter probably
remembered the colleagues of his wealthy father calling him by his nickname, which was none
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other than “King.”7 Furthermore, many planters referred to their slaves possessively but
affectionately as “my people,” 8 and they were often eager to play the part of an impartial judge in
disputes between slaves, overseers, or family members. The language of monarchy saturated
plantation life and was made manifest in the attitudes and actions of masters and slaves alike.
Although the parallels between monarchy and the culture of power in plantation life is
apparent in planters’ writings and has been well-established in studies of the colonial South, few
historians have applied this understanding to the political controversy of the revolutionary era. 9
Instead, historians’ have sought to understand the dynamics of power and culture within a
plantation in its own right, or, as in the case of Isaac, how changing political and social values
affected the plantation’s political structure. But such analysis holds a great deal of explanatory
power for why planters thought and behaved the way they did in the larger political landscape of
the British Empire. In order to gain a better understanding of why many southern planters
rejected the authority of King George III, it is important first to examine the responsibilities of
patriarchs in the political structure of some typical, large southern plantations.
The relationship between slaves and masters in America was not typically one of
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complete domination on the part of the master. In recent decades, historians have begun to
appreciate how slaves negotiated their position and managed to gain varying degrees of power on
the plantation. Slaves did not passively accept their position as chattel but expected masters to
treat them with at least some level of dignity. Henry Laurens described his relationship with his
slaves as one of “reciprocal obligation.” 10 Southern planters perceived that they had a
responsibility to provide for their slaves materially, uphold their dignity, and to protect them
from mistreatment. In return, masters expected their slaves’ loyalty, respect, and, of course, their
labor. The result was a complex relationship with understood obligations on both sides.
Landon Carter offered one of the best expressions of this reciprocal relationship in his
diary when he reflected on his interaction with eight runaway slaves. In November 1775 Lord
Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, declared martial law in the colony and shocked most of
the country by a bold proclamation concerning Virginia’s slaves. He offered freedom to any
slave who escaped his master to fight for the British army. Planters were appalled at his actions.
George Washington broke from his usually moderate language to urge Virginians to “instantly
crush” the “arch-traitor to the rights of humanity,” 11 arguing that Virginia would not know peace
while the tyrant was alive.12 The chaos that followed Dunmore’s proclamation affected Carter
personally as he learned in the summer of 1776 that eight of his slaves had run away to
Dunmore.13 Carter immediately sent messengers into the colony looking for his slaves and for
months anxiously awaited any news from them expressing in his diary both contempt and
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concern for his wayward subjects.14 He certainly was angry with Dunmore, but the full weight of
his bitterness fell instead on his runaway slaves and one slave in particular named Moses. 15
Carter heard a rumor a couple weeks after their escape that Dunmore had betrayed the runaway
slaves. Instead of offering them freedom, he allegedly sent a shipload of runaways to be sold to
the West Indies, an environment much more dangerous and grueling than a typical Virginia
plantation. Carter reacted by expressing his bitterness for Moses. It would serve him right to be
sold back into slavery, Carter wrote, and “glut his genius for liberty which he was not born to.” 16
Why did Carter express such bitterness and surprise that some of his slaves would accept
Dunmore’s offer? Surely any slave would jump at the chance for liberty just as many selfrespecting Americans would take up arms to defend their own freedom. So why did Carter take
their departure so personally? The answer is two-fold. First, Carter believed Moses and his
companions did not deserve freedom because, as he wrote, “he was not born to [it].”17 The basis
of chattel slavery in America was racial. Carter believed Moses should remain a slave, because,
as a black man, he was born a slave. 18 But there was also another reason his actions hurt Carter
so deeply. He believed he had faithfully upheld his duty as a master to provide materially for
these eight slaves, and, in return, he expected their loyalty. A year after these events, he
“reflect[ed] on [his] own conduct to Moses and his gang of runaways” and concluded that he had
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done nothing to prompt their treachery. 19 He wrote specifically about each of the eight
individuals who had escaped and described how he had been faithful to provide for them either
physically or emotionally. He had cared for four at great expense when they were sick or
injured.20 For one named Manuel, he “really obliged by bringing Suky, his wife” providing for
him not only materially, but emotionally as well. 21 He had also protected Manuel and another
slave when they were in trouble with the law. For each of the eight runaways, Carter satisfied his
conscience that they were in the wrong, because he had been careful to provide for them and
uphold the fatherly role of a master. 22
Planters believed they had an obligation to provide for their slaves not only to protect an
investment but to fulfill their end of a reciprocal relationship. Yet this was not the only
responsibility vital to the role of a plantation patriarch. Slaves also expected the master to protect
them from mistreatment. In large plantation systems, the master did not drive the slaves himself.
Instead, planters employed several men to motivate and direct slaves tending to crops and
making clothes, furniture, or other manufactured goods. These overseers, as they were called,
present a third party to the master-slave relationship. Their authority derived directly from the
master, and it was thus the master’s responsibility to define the role of overseers and to ensure a
just and proper balance between severity and leniency in how each treated the slaves under his
supervision. Most planters believed it was their duty as a kingly protector to shield his slaves
from the cruelty of arbitrary power. Laurens explained his view best in a letter of August 1766.
19
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A merchant friend of his suggested that planters expand their business to the western part of the
colony and begin new plantations in that sparsely populated region. Laurens rejected the idea
because there would be no way to supervise such a remote plantation and slaves “might be
exposed to the arbitrary power of an Overseer.”23 In order for the three-way relationship between
masters, overseers, and slaves to operate properly, the master had to maintain vigilance and form
a system of communication between planters and slaves. 24
An overseer’s daily life was a constant struggle to live up to his employer’s expectations.
The writings of southern planters are full of rebukes and admonishments from planters to their
overseers. Slave-owners controlled not only how overseers conducted their business with slaves
but almost every other aspect of their lives as well. Planters’ letters and diary entries concerning
their overseers indicate that, though paid well, overseers enjoyed, in some ways, even less
freedom than the slaves they supervised. Carter hired John King to overlook two parts of his
plantation in September 1757. The terms of employment included a promise that he “follow all
my Directions in every thing” and that he refrain from “go[ing] abroad without my leave and to
use every kind of Diligence.”25 Another example is Washington, who repeatedly insisted that his
overseers remain “always with [their] people” and that they refrain from taking visitors into their
home, which might distract them from their duties. 26 The job of an overseer not only required
constant attention but also a great sacrifice in their personal lives. Masters often scolded their
employees for failing to bring in an adequate crop or for behaving unprofessionally, but these
23
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rebukes also contained warnings and instructions on how to treat slaves. Henry Laurens, for
example, warned one of his overseers to “remember on your part not to make ill use of your
power.”27 Overseers were expected to behave judiciously with their slaves, and their employers
had means of assuring that they did.
Planters generally took pride in ensuring communication between slaves and masters
concerning the conduct of the overseer. Masters often allowed their slaves to come to them with
complaints of mistreatment and considered it their duty to investigate their concerns. Evidence
that slaves were able to bring complaints of mistreatment to their masters is abundant in several
planters’ diaries and letters. Washington’s opinion of his overseers often depended on how many
complaints he heard from the slaves under their care. He was not pleased with one of his
overseers, Hyland Crow, because he “had too frequent complaints of ill treatment.”28 On the
other hand, another overseer by the name of William Stuart he described as a sober honest man
who, though he was talkative and at times arrogant, was an excellent overseer because he lived
“in peace and harmony with the Negroes who are confided to his care,” none of which had ever
made a complaint against him. 29 Laurens wrote that some of his slaves had come to him to tell
him that one of his overseers, Abraham Shad, was too hard on them. In this case, Laurens did not
take his slave’s side, but he was careful to investigate the matter and caution Schad to live in
27
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peace with his slaves.30 Laurens and other planters were often eager “to play the part of the
patriarchal judge,” investigating complaints thoroughly and exacting punishment on the
deserving party.31
Though planters’ letters and diaries reveal that there was a channel of communication
between masters and slaves, they do not usually describe in detail how slaves would make their
complaints heard. Philip Vickers Fithian, while serving as a tutor in Landon Carter’s plantation
home, however, described a powerful scene of a slave asking his master to intervene in a
conflict. “An old Negro Man,” Fithian recounted in his journal, complained to Carter that his
overseer had been withholding food from him. 32 The elderly slave appeared before Carter
directly in his home in order to make his complaint known. But, possibly because it was a fairly
common occurrence, it was not this act alone that made a lasting impression on Fithian. Rather,
“the humble posture” he took before his master evoked strong emotions in the observer. “We
were sitting in the passage,” he continued, when the old man “sat himself down on the Floor
clasp’d his Hands together, with his face directly to Mr Carter, & then began his Narration.”33
Not only does Fithian’s description show an example of how slaves brought complaints to their
masters, but it also exposes an important aspect of their relationship. The old man’s behavior
reveals that, at least in this case, slaves operated in the hierarchical structure of the plantation
system. The image of the slave posturing himself humbly before his master as he petitioned for
justice struck Fithian powerfully, because it reinforced the master and slave’s respective roles as
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king and subject on this plantation kingdom. 34
Carter’s diary offers another example of how slaves made an appeal to their master. This
account has added value, because Carter described in detail how he responded to a slave’s
complaint. Fithian’s account showed that slaves had the opportunity to come before Carter to
make their grievances known. Carter did not deny that right to any slave on his plantation, even
if that slave was no more than a child. In June 1773, just before bedtime, a little girl “came up
and shewed a bloody ear which she said John Selfe’s [one of the overseers’] wife with whom she
lived had Stuck pins in.”35 Carter promised that he would investigate the girl’s complaints
thoroughly, fancying himself an impartial judge as he wrote that he would “suspend [his]
conclusion until [he] could hear farther about it.”36
The next morning, he discussed the conflict with the girl again. The interview must have
been an incongruous scene – the powerful, aged patriarch before a small, timid black girl in
eighteenth-century Virginia – but it was Carter’s responsibility to see to the girl’s protection.
“She stood still for some time,” Carter wrote, “and at last” confessed to her crime. 37 She had lied;
Selfe’s wife had not mistreated her. Selfe himself had whipped her in punishment for aiding two
slaves who had stolen corn from his warehouse. The girl’s grandmother, an old woman named
Sukey, she confessed, had convinced her to tell Carter that Selfe’s wife had mistreated her in
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order to trick Carter into removing the girl from the Selfe’s residence. 38
An uncaring judge might have let the matter go, but Carter was still concerned for the
girl’s safety. What of the bloody ear? Had Selfe seen fit to punish this girl so severely that he
would whip her on the face? He spoke with Selfe who confessed to damaging the girl’s ear by
mistake during her punishment. Finally satisfied, Carter laid the matter to rest. Though he gave
Selfe no rebuke for this carelessness, he did not punish the girl for her lie either. He had
considered all sides of the situation and concluded that he had done his duty to protect his slaves
from mistreatment.39
Enter the girl’s grandmother, the scheming “Granny Sukey,” who had encouraged her
granddaughter to lie about the bloody ear. Carter’s next entry revealed Sukey’s motivation for
the lie and her anger when her scheme had not worked. “Sukey, the old Granny before spoken
of,” Carter wrote, “to be revenged because I would not take her granddaughter away turned out
all my Cattle last night on my Cowpen ground which have done me a very prodigious
mischief.”40 Comical as this scene is, it contains a revealing truth about the master-slave
relationship. When Granny Sukey concluded that Carter had not done enough to protect her
granddaughter, she engaged in what she saw as righteous rebellion. Apparently, she believed her
granddaughter had grown “poor and starved” under the Selfe family’s care. Carter was of course
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furious for the slave’s misconduct and promised to “repay this treatment.”41
This story is significant for three reasons. First, the fact that a slave, a small child no less,
could come directly to Carter’s home and declare a grievance speaks volumes. Carter and his
family were certainly accessible when slaves had a complaint. Second, Carter cared enough to
investigate the child’s concerns and possibly postpone punishing two thieves in their midst.42
Furthermore, he took great pride in his efforts as he thought he had done well to fulfill his
patriarchal duty. Third, Granny Sukey’s rebellious act reveals that both planters and slaves
believed masters had a duty to protect them from mistreatment. Carter did not imagine this duty;
rather, it existed as part of an unspoken agreement in the master-slave relationship. Though
Carter was convinced he had fulfilled his duty in protecting the girl, Granny Sukey was not
satisfied. Because Carter had not fulfilled her expectations to care and protect her granddaughter,
she felt justified in expressing her anger by setting free Carter’s heard of cattle.
Planters’ diaries and letters suggest that the presence of slavery in their daily lives
informed the language of their political protest of Great Britain. Historians have documented
how Americans compared their situation under British oppression to the experience of the
African slaves in their midst.43 This is no less true of southern planters, whose political writings
are full of references to slavery. Laurens wrote soon after the outbreak of hostilities in
Massachusetts that every American should be ready to take up arms against a government that
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had pursued in America “a State of Subjection little better than Slavery.” 44 Carter counted the
cost of Great Britain’s oppressive policies after he learned that three more of his slaves had run
away to the British in February 1777. Ironically, he insisted that if Great Britain did not stop
stealing his “property” in this way, he would be reduced to slavery and beggary. 45
That planters used the language of bondage to describe their political fears suggests that
the institution of slavery, along with its complex system of mutual obligation, was a vital part of
their interpretive framework in civil matters. In light of this, it is plausible that planters allowed
their relationship with slavery to inform their relationship with King George III. Just as planters
knew they had a duty to provide for and protect their slaves, they believed the king of Great
Britain had a duty to protect them from arbitrary power. They believed George III had betrayed
them because he failed to fulfill his side of a reciprocal relationship. 46
Some planters of the revolutionary era continued to uphold the principles of monarchy
and hierarchy despite the political upheaval that surrounded them. After all, they had an interest
in hierarchy, because it provided the basis for order on their plantation and justification for their
patriarchal authority. Washington, Carter, and Laurens were all planters who, in their own time
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and in their own way, eventually embraced independence. 47 Nevertheless, at the time of
independence they did not show an aversion to monarchy as many other revolutionaries had.
The planters’ reaction to Thomas Paine’s Common Sense is revealing, because they
agreed with many of its arguments but rejected its attack on monarchy as inherently unjust.
Washington, the first of the three to support independence, recognized that his “countrymen”
would find it difficult to accept Paine’s arguments because of their “steady attachment heretofore
to royalty.”48 Washington was more supportive of the pamphlet than either Laurens or Carter, but
he recognized that his countrymen would have trouble accepting Paine’s arguments, especially
his sweeping criticism of monarchy as a form of government.
Laurens was more tenacious in his criticism of Common Sense. He spoke publically
against Paine’s arguments and “more against those indecent expressions” concerning monarchy.
He recognized that its arguments were compelling and might “make many converts to
Republican principles,” but Laurens and his countrymen in the South would only accept it if “the
present scene of Kingly persecution is much longer continued.” 49 He ardently hoped and prayed
that God would “interpose, to Soften the Hearts of the King & his Counselors” to avoid a break
with the country he loved so dearly. 50 The thought of independence, Laurens wrote to a friend in
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England, “has caused tears to trickle down my cheeks.” Still, he recognized its inevitability. 51
When he heard that the Continental Congress had declared independence, he did not join in the
rejoicing of many of the citizens of Charles Town. Instead, the news inspired “a Tear of affection
for the good old Country & for the people in it whom I dearly Love.” 52 Regarding the king, he
felt like a “dutiful Son, thrust by the hand of violence out of a Father’s House into the wide
World.” He did not blame the king for the separation, but continued to find fault in the advice of
his ministers. He even felt pity for George III, who he believed had “been greatly deceived and
abused.”53
For Carter, Common Sense inspired anger rather than sadness. He railed against the
pamphlet in his usual aggressive tone, giving his “opinion freely as to the nonsense instead of
Common Sense advanced.”54 He believed that America should not declare independence unless
absolutely forced to do so, because “as a constitution of government none was so good as the
British.”55 Carter believed in monarchy, especially Britain’s constitutional monarchy so
strongly, in fact, that if America was forced to make the lamentable break with Great Britain, he
believed she should establish a new government on the British model. He continued, “though we
need not be under the control of [the British constitution’s] now depraved arbitrariness . . . it
would be best for us to embrace the same mixed form.”56 He argued that “in its Purity” the
British constitution had no inherent tendency toward oppression and that “ministerial corruption”
had caused the current crisis. 57
Carter despised Paine’s anti-monarchical arguments, because, he argued, patriots should
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not object to “a limited monarchy . . . on account of some possible arbitrariness that may be
introduced into it.” Any form of government, whether it be monarchical or republican, was prone
to fall into tyranny. As for “these Republican distractions” he insisted “I see no difference; an
evil begot how it will and necessity is no better plea in a Republican form than it is or can be in a
monarchical form.”58 Carter was not against the English constitution. Rather, his aggression was
stronger against Republicanism. The problem was more personal for Carter. He argued that
George III and his ministry, rather than some flaw in the British constitution, were to blame for
the trouble. 59
Just as slaves (at least in planters’ minds) perceived that overseers were the immediate
cause of their oppression, so planters blamed their troubles not on the king himself but on the
British ministry. The king’s ministers, like overseers, had a vital role in colonial politics.
Because they received their power directly from the king, they provided a means for Americans
to protest the actions of the British executive branch without questioning the ultimate authority
of the king himself. In June 1775, Laurens expressed his concerns that corrupt ministers were
deceiving the king. Writing to his son, Laurens insisted that he continued to revere the name of
King George III and hoped that he and his successors would remain on the throne of both
England and America. His evil ministers ought to be removed, though, because “his majesty has
been misinformed: Ill advised by some of our fellow subjects, who are His Majesty’s Enemies &
the Enemies of his faithful Americans against those I am willing & shall be willing to bear Arms
& to repel force by force . . . .”60 Laurens was neither a loyalist nor a pacifist. He was willing to
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fight for American freedoms. But in taking up arms against the king’s troops, he did not believe
he fought the king himself but “the machinations of a few Wicked Men who falsely call
themselves his friends.”61
Like Laurens, Carter also put the blame on the king’s ministers. He expressed his
suspicion of any proclamation that came in the king’s name. He believed that George III’s
speeches and proclamations might not have been his own words, but only the writings of his
ministers. Their manipulation, Carter argued, blocked communication between the king and his
subjects, to the point that “the National Sun [was] no more Permitted to shine on his grateful
people than Charles II was.” How would Americans know whether royal proclamations were the
king’s words? Perhaps royal ministers had deceived the king and convinced him to sign his name
to their slanderous statements.62 Though Carter became convinced of the corruption of the king
himself much earlier than some other planters, he assumed that the oppression had started with
the scheming of malevolent ministers rather than originating in the designs of the king himself.
The plantation system would break down if slaves were not able to communicate with their
masters. In a similar way, Carter feared that the king’s ministers had blocked Americans’
communication with the monarch, and the British Empire had fallen into distress as a result.
While these planters believed that the crisis had arisen from the king’s crooked advisors,
they eventually began to blame George III himself when he failed to protect them from the
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arbitrary power of his corrupt ministers. Planters expected the monarch to listen to the pleas of
his subjects just as they investigated the complaints of their slaves, but the king continually
refused to receive their petitions. Washington wrote in January 1776 that one of the king’s recent
speeches made it clear that he would persist in “disregarding the Petition from the United Voice
of America, nothing less than the total Subversion of her Rights, will satisfie him.”63 Ever since
he had heard that the king was planning to send a large force to subdue Americans, he had lost
hope for reconciliation with Great Britain. The inevitable break would come, and it would be the
king’s fault for ignoring their petitions for so long. “I would tell them,” he wrote:
that we had borne much, that we had long and ardently sought for reconciliation upon
honorable terms, that it had been denied us, that all our attempts after peace had proved
abortive, and had been grossly misrepresented, that we had done every thing which could
be expected from the best of subjects, that the spirit of freedom beat too high in us to
submit to slavery, and that if nothing else could satisfy a tyrant and his diabolical
ministry, we are determined to shake off all connexions with a state so unjust and
unnatural.64
Washington believed by the beginning of 1776 that the time for petition had passed. King
George III had ignored the concerns of his people for too long. Rather than fulfilling his duty to
listen and investigate the complaints of his subjects, he had ignored them completely.
As early as May 1775, Laurens also began to suspect, that the king was “at the bottom of
all this mischief.”65 Laurens continued to hope for reconciliation, but he began to blame the king
rather than his ministers for their oppression. He believed the loyal American subjects of the
British monarch had been “aggrieved” and they did not take up arms against their enemies out of
“Licentious or Rebellious principles.” Americans had demonstrated this through their careful
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petitions, which the king had repeatedly ignored.66 Indeed, Laurens used some of the same
language as that of another southern planter, Thomas Jefferson, in the Declaration of
Independence. A major justification for dissolving royal authority in America and severing all
connections with Great Britain was that “in every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned
for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by
repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a
Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.”67 George III’s refusal to respond to American
petitions was one of the main grievances that led to independence.
Carter fought against independence throughout the first half of 1776, but this did not
mean he approved of the king’s actions. For him King George III was no better than the tyrant
king Charles I and ought to lose his authority. Carter dreamed of a reprise of the English Civil
War, an internal revolution in England, rather than a war for independence in America. He would
rejoice, he wrote, to hear that the people of England had removed “the tyrant hypocrite from his
throne.”68 Carter’s cynicism was born out of the king’s own words. He did not believe that “the
King with so foul a mouth as that with what he opened in his last speech can ever desire or
design to grant America her reasonable demands now.”69 The king’s inattentiveness to the
concerns of America had jaded this southern planter.
Not only did Carter compare George III to despots in England’s past, but he also aligned
him with one of the most famous tyrants in history, Nero of ancient Rome. While reading the
writings of Tacitus, he came across an anecdote that was “so similar to our own [circumstances]
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in the Present contest” that he had to record his thoughts about it. During the time of Nero, the
“Ancient Britons” were in rebellion, so the emperor sent his general, Polyclatus, to the British
island to bring peace. When Polyclatus arrived, “those hardy ancestors of ours” laughed at him,
asking how such a powerful man with an experienced army “could be so subservient to the
Slavish commands of the Despot who sent them!” 70
Carter described many connections between the story and the American Revolution. He
believed that George III, as the tyrannical Nero, had sent over his own Polyclatus, General
Howe, who also found that subduing the American people would not be any easier than quelling
the rebellion of their ancient ancestors. Carter hoped that Americans would show the same
contempt for this modern Nero’s general and “forever hug that independency . . . that has thus
providentially brought about a Seperation [sic] from such a Tyrant, and his adherents.”71 By
early 1777, Carter had embraced independence and celebrated the break from the tyrant king
George III. Like the mythical Nero, who ignored the suffering of his citizens and played his
fiddle as Rome burned, so George III had disregarded his subjects for too long and thereby lost
their affection and loyalty forever. Carter imagined that George III “like . . . Nero on his death
bed . . . will have it to lament, that he had neither friend nor foe to shorten his career, before he
got to his length of Despotism. It is indeed a pity.” 72
These examples suggest that a major reason why some southern planters rejected the
authority of King George III was his failure to fulfill his duty to address their petitions. On some
level, planters based their understanding of the king’s responsibilities on their relationship with
the slaves on their plantation. The British ministry, who like plantation overseers, derived their
authority from a benevolent ruler had become oppressive and began to exert arbitrary power over
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the American people. Southern planters rebelled because they believed their sovereign had not
adequately fulfilled his obligation in a reciprocal relationship, a reciprocity they sought to honor
every day as they governed their plantation societies.
The master-slave relationship was not entirely one-sided. Though the nature of chattel
slavery made this exchange inherently unequal, there was a level of reciprocity in the
relationship. Slaves expected their master to provide for their material needs and to protect them
from arbitrary power, and masters accepted and even relished in fulfilling these expectations. It
stands to reason, then, that given the hierarchical worldview southern planters held, they would
expect the same service from their king, especially when it came to protection from arbitrary
power. Though planters did not think of themselves as slaves, they did submit themselves to the
authority of the king just as slaves submitted themselves to the authority of the master provided
he fulfilled his obligations according to their standards. The writings of some planters concerning
the revolutionary crisis reveal that, although some defended the merits of monarchy and
hierarchy, they believed that King George III had betrayed the American people in failing to
protect them from the arbitrary power of Parliament and the British ministry. Southern planters
found themselves in the same predicament as Granny Sukey of Landon Carter’s plantation.
When she believed her master had not adequately protected his slaves from mistreatment, she
rebelled by letting loose Carter’s heard of cattle. With the same righteous anger, southern
planters, because their master-king had failed to protect them from the cruelty of arbitrary power,
also rebelled and let loose the bonds of loyalty that had once bound America to the British
monarch.
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Chapter 3:
“No Trace of Papal Bondage:”
American Patriot Ministers and the Fall of King George III

Just as southern planters understood the political turmoil around them through the lens of
their common experience, American patriot ministers used the interpretive framework of their
religion to protest ministerial and ultimately royal authority. They turned to the Bible and the
role of Protestantism in English history as a means to interpret the activities of their imperial
government and even to predict its future actions. For many ministers, the American Revolution
was more than a political struggle. It was a fight for the very soul of America. Despite
differences of opinion among competing denominations, almost all American ministers were
committed to a single cause: the spread of Protestant influence throughout the world and the
opposition of any “trace of papal bondage” in the English Empire. 1 Many patriot ministers
believed they fought not only against a tyrannical regime committed to reducing Americans to
political slavery, but against a conspiracy to strip them of religious freedom in order to impose
ecclesiastical oppression and popery in America. The political protest of patriot ministers
centered on their concern for protecting the Protestant cause in colonial America against a
perceived Catholic conspiracy that first implicated the British ministry and ultimately the king
himself. As the nature of their political protest changed from an indictment of the British
ministry to a full rejection of the authority of George III, American patriot ministers looked to
British history, their current experience, and ultimately the instruction of Scripture as their guide.
Ministers in the revolutionary era held more influence over society as a whole than
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perhaps any other group of educated Americans. Every religious gathering afforded ministers an
opportunity to influence their communities as they spoke from a position of great authority and
respect. Furthermore, the published sermons of some ministers made it into the hands of
thousands of American colonists hungry for familiar language to help interpret their experience. 2
Ministers used this enormous influence to guide Americans spiritually and politically throughout
the revolutionary crisis.
Sermons were not the only published material that helped British Americans identify with
the Protestant cause. Brendan McConville argued that a variety of writings such as political
pamphlets and especially calendar almanacs helped Americans identify with a shared “imperial
historical identity” throughout the early eighteenth century. 3 This identity was vital to the
emergence of the English Empire after the Glorious Revolution and centered on the Protestant
cause in Europe and throughout the world. Americans began to link Protestantism with the
succession of English monarchs as writers defined the reign of kings and queens of previous
decades by their role in the struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism in Britain. In this
way, almanac writers, pamphleteers, and ministers alike used the religious nature of the Glorious
Revolution to “establish the legitimacy of Britain’s foreign-born Protestant monarchs.” 4
This last point is especially significant, because it reveals one of the most important
responsibilities American colonists in general, and American ministers in particular, expected of
their ruling monarch after the Glorious Revolution. In their minds, the most important duty of the
king was to advance the Protestant cause in the British Empire. Though William III and the
2
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Hanoverians were foreigners (the Hanoverians were German and William Dutch), their reign
was justified precisely because they were Protestants committed to banishing any sign of
Catholic hegemony in Britain. 5 Samuel Sherwood of Connecticut expressed this view in a 1774
sermon. He argued that the people of Britain were justified in subduing James II and
“introducing king William . . . to the throne, to sway the scepter in righteousness.”6 In the same
way, he expressed his confidence in the Hanoverian succession, because they protected
England’s Protestant interests. “We must throw up the present constitution of England and the
Hanover family” he wrote, “and turn back in our allegiance to the Stuart family; and to their
popish plan of government.”7 For many Americans then, and especially for patriot ministers, the
British king’s commitment to his role as a protector of Protestant interests was a condition, even
a prerequisite, of their continued loyalty.
Many sermons reveal that patriot ministers valued religious liberty above any other
freedom they enjoyed and that they believed the slightest increase in Catholic influence in
Britain would threaten their right to worship God as they chose. Isaac Backus, a Baptist minister,
called “liberty of conscience” the “dearest of all rights,” and did not shy away from criticizing
not only Great Britain’s policies but America’s as well. 8 In a later sermon, he argued that “civil
and ecclesiastical government” should remain separate. The church, he believed, armed with
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“light and truth" should encourage good in society, while civil government, armed with the
“sword to guard the peace,” should focus its attention on protecting the liberty of individuals. If
the two were separate and did not interfere, “the effects are happy,” but brought together, tyranny
would certainly follow. 9
Henry Cumings, a Massachusetts Congregational minister, expressed the importance of
religious liberty along with his gratitude for the religious tolerance he enjoyed as a British
subject. In a 1766 sermon, Cumings was happy to praise the English government because of its
commitment to religious liberty.10 He wrote that the “infernal fiend, persecution for conscience
sake,” had been “utterly exterminated” in the British Empire. Americans should not take this for
granted, he wrote, but pray that this freedom would continue and that America remain “free from
papal usurpation and tyranny, the most cruel, and impious of any.” 11 Nearly a decade later, in a
1775 sermon, Cumings was relieved to say that, although Britain had encroached on their civil
liberties, at least “God has not yet permitted our religious priveleges [sic] to be formally
invaded.”12 Cumings consoled his congregation with the knowledge that, though the British
ministry had invaded many of their rights, they held on to religious liberty. He valued freedom of
worship above any other political right that might come under attack.
Along with this encouragement, though, Cumings also issued a warning. Religious
persecution, he argued, was certain to follow any instance of political tyranny. Religious liberty
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remained under threat should Britain’s oppressive actions continue, “for civil and ecclesiastical
tyranny are nearly allied; and the latter follows close at the heels of the former.” 13 Cumings was
not the only American minister to express such a sentiment. Joseph Lyman of Massachusetts also
warned his church in 1774 that if they allowed the British government to take their civil rights,
their “religion will be driven into the corners.”14 Another Congregationalist from Massachusetts,
Samuel Cooper, aligned religious persecution and popery with political oppression in the same
way. In a 1773 sermon, he boldly argued that “popery is incompatible with the safety of a free
government.”15 Catholicism, he contended “sets up a foreign head, superior to all civil rulers”
that has no limit to its power to control every aspect of individuals’ lives. 16 This, more than any
other principle was Cooper’s rallying point for American patriots. What Americans had most to
fear was not the king’s troops or taxation without representation, but a rise in popish influence in
America. He ended his sermon with an impassioned plea to oppose ministerial oppression “and
allow . . . no trace of papal bondage, to be found among us.”17 American ministers, guided by
their mutual history and Protestant religion, drew a deep connection between religious and civil
tyranny, between oppression and Catholicism. Any instance of political coercion in the English
Empire was evidence of an alarming rise of Catholic influence in one or more parts of the British
government.
By 1774, ministers began to express openly the view that there was an active conspiracy
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within the British government to take away American’s religious and civil liberties. This
conspiracy, they claimed, had its roots among ill-designing individuals within the British
ministry. Lyman argued that the ministry used their power over the national treasure to control
Parliament, which explains the “most grievous edicts” that that body had enacted in recent
years. 18 This statement is particularly significant, because it shows a shift toward blaming the
British ministry rather than Parliament for America’s persecution. Lyman almost goes so far as
to defend the Parliament at the expense of the ministry, even though other groups of Americans,
including the Continental Congress, had for some time focused on Parliament as the main source
of their oppression in most of their petitions and complaints. The center of blame inched closer
to the king himself as the imperial conflict escalated throughout the 1770s.
Henry Cumings expressed similar convictions in a sermon given late in 1775. He
endeavored to encourage Americans that, though their country had suffered much, Providence
had not forgotten them. He cited several historical and biblical instances of how God directed
events to foil the plans of despotism and promote the cause of the oppressed. In a tone that may
have suggested eventual independence, he argued that God might have allowed the trouble with
Britain to endure so long in order to promote America in the end and lift her up to a place of
influence in the world. 19 God was able, he preached encouragingly, to “over-rule the oppressive
and arbitrary schemes that are now formed against America.” For Cumings as well, the source of
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these schemes was “unconstitutional and violent ministerial politicks.” 20 Nevertheless, in this
1775 sermon, Cumings did not go so far as to blame George III himself for the schemes of his
ministers. In fact, in the same way that Lyman defended the British Parliament, Cumings insisted
that the king had failed to respond to their petitions, not because he was involved in this plot, but
because his ministers had blinded their monarch as part of a conspiracy against America.21
Reconciliation with the British government would be almost impossible if the king’s corrupt
advisors continued in their plans, but many patriot preachers still hoped that the king, their
Protestant protector, would put an end to the scheming of his popish counselors.
Cumings, Lyman, and other American pastors based their fear of an anti-American
conspiracy within the British ministry on their mutual experience in the colonial past, the present
actions of the British government, and signs of the present and future fulfillment of biblical
prophecy. Isaac Backus appealed to the lessons of the British past to discount the concept of
“passive obedience and non-resistance to kings,” which loyalist ministers were preaching at the
time.22 In his view, by accepting passive obedience, Americans were falling into the same trap as
their seventeenth-century ancestors, who waited far too long to resist the despotism of James II.
Passive obedience was, Backus wrote “much preached up in James 2ds day, till the nation was
brought so upon the brink of popery and slavery that the very biships [sic] who preached that
20
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doctrine up were forced to act against it.”23 Therefore, Americans, in order to avoid the same
struggles as their patriot forefathers, should oppose those in the British government who they
believed they were taking them down the path toward tyranny and popery.
Samuel Sherwood also appealed to English history to motivate Americans to oppose the
oppressive measures of the British government, which he believed derived from Catholic
influence. In the past, Sherwood reminded his audience, England had accepted Catholicism and
“the man of sin reigned triumphant in our mother-country, without much check or control.” 24
Catholics ruled their mother country before England’s break with the pope under King Henry
VIII, then with the bloody reign of Queen Mary, and most recently, the reign of the Stuarts that
had met its final end in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Great Britain had only escaped
ecclesiastical tyranny through the heroic efforts of their forefathers. Once again, he argued, the
present ministry tended to accept popery and might harm the Protestant cause if Americans did
not stand up as their ancestors had done and put a stop to their enemies’ schemes. 25
Cumings linked his present experience to the historical past in his sermons by recounting
several similarities between the conflict with Great Britain and the tyrannical rule of James II.
That monarch, “an avowed papist,” as Cumings was careful to point out, sent “Sir Edmond
Andros to execute his tyrannical schemes in New-England.”26 Andros, he believed, not only
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threatened New Englanders’ civil freedoms, but the free exercise of their religion as well. 27 Had
the people not resisted Andros’s tyrannical schemes, and God not intervened in Great Britain to
depose the “haughty despot,” Americans might not have enjoyed the freedoms they had in
Cumings’s time. 28 There was much to fear, because individuals within the British Parliament and
ministry had hatched a conspiracy every bit as evil, according to Cumings, as the schemes of the
Stuart monarchs. He argued that the Glorious Revolution provided a precedent and justification
for America’s resistance to what he believed to be tyranny, not of an individual, but of “a
number of men.”29 Tyranny of an absolute monarch and tyranny of a legislature were the same in
Cumings’s view, and Americans should resist despotism in any form for the same reason as their
seventeenth-century ancestors. Parliament’s assertion of their power to “legislate for us ‘in all
cases whatsoever’” placed Americans in very much the same dangerous position as those who
opposed the reign of the Stuarts.30
Cumings feared the present conflict could result in the subjection of Americans’ religious
liberty, but his most radical arguments revealed his darkest suspicions. He suggested that
conspirators within the British government had made it their ultimate goal to depose King
George III and return the Stuart family to the throne of England. Cumings argued that they
should oppose the British Parliament and ministry in order to protect the king because “his
present Majesty’s right to the throne depends” on “the principles of the revolutions, which are
27
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evidently in favour of America.” 31 It was possible, he imagined, that the “movers and abettors of
the present oppressive and violent measures . . . are themselves Jacobites in heart.” Possibly, they
hoped first to embarrass George III by inciting rebellion among his loyal subjects in America
and, taking advantage of the political confusion and the king’s mishandling of the empire,
“introduce the Pretender and advance the Stuarts family to its ancient dignity.” 32
Cumings’s accusations are significant for three major reasons. First, they highlight that
ministers tended to link their growing fear of a hostile conspiracy in the British government to
the history of the Glorious Revolution. The experience of the British Empire in the late
seventeenth century gave them a framework to interpret and predict the actions of the British
government. The religious concerns underlying the conflict with the Stuart monarchs gave
ministers further alarm that the British Parliament and ministry, aside from conspiring to oppress
America and even to overthrow the Hanoverian succession, also wanted to limit Americans’
religious freedom and impose a papal regime in America and Britain. The link between religious
and civil persecution in the narrative of the Glorious Revolution solidified ministers’ perception
of an intimate connection between tyranny and papacy.
Second, Cumings’s suggestion that conspirators might ultimately attempt to dispossess
George III and restore his Catholic enemies to power shows a perceived connection between
political and ecclesiastical tyranny. English history and other signs 33 spoke to the legitimacy of
their suspicion and helps to explain the tenacity of minister’s resistance. The link between
political and ecclesiastical persecution, in Cumings’s view of the world, allowed him to reason
31
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that if American ministers were exhibiting unjust tendencies, they must be under Catholic
influence and were therefore capable of conspiring to overthrow George III, the Protestant
protector of Great Britain. 34
Third, Cumings’ extreme accusation concerning the treachery of the government’s
administration suggests that he was willing to go to great lengths to avoid implicating the king in
this conspiracy. 35 If corrupt ministers were plotting eventually to depose George III, the British
monarch would be free from blame for his ministers’ actions. While Cumings certainly believed
such a treasonous plot was plausible, he may have communicated this view in order to convince
himself and others that the king had no knowledge of a growing conspiracy against America. If
the king’s ministers continued in their plot to reduce Americans to political slavery, it was only a
matter of time before Americans would have to hold the king responsible for the actions of his
ministers. The possibility of a conspiracy not only against Americans but against the king
himself allowed Cumings, whether consciously or not, to postpone or disavow such a disturbing
inevitability.
American patriot ministers also pointed to the present actions of the British government
as evidence that conspirators were plotting to take away American religious liberty and expand
Catholic hegemony in the British Empire. The passage of the Quebec Act in 1774 eroded
ministers’ trust in the British ministry. Joseph Lyman argued that the Quebec act “shews in it’s
[sic] true light, [the British ministry’s] desperate designs.”36 The Act, Lyman said, because of the
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very nature of Catholicism, threatened both American religious liberty and the stability of local
governments. By establishing Catholicism in North America and expanding the territory of
Quebec, the government had encouraged a religion which was “subversive not only of all other
religion, but of all civil government.”37 Furthermore, he argued, the ministry might have
established the act in part to turn native Americans and Canadians against British Americans.
“This is no imaginary Fear,” Lyman wrote, “For the Quebec Bill was made, as it was said in
Parliament . . . in order to be a curb upon the licentiousness of the other colonies.” 38 Cumings
agreed in a 1775 sermon, stating that “From the Canada bill, and some other things favourable to
popery, we have grounds to fear” that the British ministry had it in mind to allow popery to “ride
triumphant over the heads of true Protestants, making multitudes drunk with the wine of her
fornications.”39 Sherwood also suggested that the true aim of the Act was to “bring the savages
down upon us, to our utter destruction.” 40 The passage of the Quebec Act, more than any other
event before independence, contributed to the patriot clergy’s fears that members of the British
Parliament and ministry were involved in a conspiracy not only to subjugate American liberty
but also to harm the Protestant cause in the British Empire.
American preachers also looked to biblical prophecy as a way to understand the
significance of the events surrounding them and to express suspicions concerning parts of the
British government. The most complete and dramatic example of this is Samuel Sherwood’s
January 1776 sermon, The Church’s Flight into the Wilderness: An Address on the Times.41 In
this sermon, Sherwood argued that some scriptural prophecies “plainly relate” to the conflict
37
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between Great Britain and British America. 42 Specifically, he referred to the prophecy found in
Revelation 12, which told of the apostle John’s vision of a woman, who after giving birth to a
child, fled into the wilderness to escape the persecution of a terrifying, seven-headed dragon.43
The dragon in this prophecy, according to Sherwood, referred to Catholicism. He argued
that because popery had been the greatest force in history opposed to the true Christian church
throughout the world, “we may rationally conclude that more prophecies relate to that, than to
any other distant event.”44 Sherwood’s congregation would likely have been familiar with this
interpretation of the dragon of Revelation 12 referring to the Catholic Church. Other American
ministers held the same view and incorporated it into their anti-Catholic rhetoric. 45 The
corrupting power of popery, he argued, had spread to “all nations and kingdoms of the world in
general, and . . . the kings and princes of the earth . . . were to be much intoxicated and infatuated
therewith.”46
Going further than many of his contemporaries, though, Sherwood adopted an even more
complex interpretation of the dragon of Revelation 12 and 13, an interpretation that implicated
the government of Great Britain as an accomplice to the papal beast’s persecution. Revelation 13
speaks of the “image of the beast,” which Sherwood argued referred to governments that
42
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resembled the Roman popery and had fallen under its influence.47 Great Britain was one of those
governments. Like Sherwood’s contemporaries, he offered the Quebec Act and Great Britain’s
tendency to fall under Catholic influence in the past as evidence that it had risen again in “the
ministry and parliament of Great Britain, which appears so favourable to popery and the Roman
catholic interest.”48 Contemporaries of Sherwood, including the rationalist Samuel West, also
argued this prophecy might refer to Great Britain because “the description” of the beast in
Revelation “will answer better to be understood of political, than ecclesiastical tyrants.” 49
Having established Great Britain’s role in the prophecy, Sherwood insisted that it and
many other prophecies referred to “the state of Christ’s church, in this American quarter of the
globe; and will sooner or later have their fulfillment and accomplishment among us.” 50 The
establishment of a Protestant empire in America was exceptional in world history, and Sherwood
believed God had preserved the established church there for generations in order to advance the
cause of Christianity. 51 The woman in the passage, therefore, referred to America, which was in
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the birth pains to deliver the “true church of Christ” to the world. 52 In line with the prophecy,
“our fore-fathers” left England and travelled to “this then howling wilderness” in order to
“secure abode for unadulterated christianity, liberty and peace.”53 For generations thereafter,
Britain had oppressed America with the help of “evil, wicked men.” 54 Sherwood cited specific
instances throughout history of how Britain had attempted to destroy American religious liberty,
giving the names of their oppressors, which included Edmund Andros, Lord Cornbury, Bernard,
Hutchinson, Gage, Carlton, and Dunmore. The fact that he referred to both historical and
contemporary individuals shows that he believed the current oppressive measures of the British
government to be part of one long train of persecutions meant to hinder America’s Christian
mission.
Just as the dragon of Revelation 12 became “wroth with the woman, and went to make
war with the remnant of her seed,” so too Great Britain made war against Americans. 55 Because
all her oppressive measures had failed, according to Sherwood, Britain had finally shown its true
schemes in actively waging war against those who most “strictly and conscientiously adhere to
the pure uncorrupted doctrine and worship of our pious forefathers.” 56 The dragon in Revelation
made war with the woman’s offspring “which keep the commandments of God, and have the
testimony of Jesus Christ.”57 In the same way, the British government under the antichristian
influence of popery also made war against not only America’s civil liberties, but Christ’s “pure
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gospel.”58
Sherwood’s The Church’s Flight into the Wilderness is significant, because it succinctly
explained the complexity of the motivation for political protest among many American religious
leaders. Sherwood’s analysis of this prophecy linked the political conflict of the 1770s to the
greater narrative of the religious mission of the true Christian church. The current contest was,
for many American preachers, an essential part of, if not the culmination of, a centuries-old
struggle between the evangelistic mission of Christ and the opposing forces of the antichrist
embodied in the Catholic-Protestant conflict. American ministers looked to biblical prophecies
concerning the end times in order to predict America’s fate, because they believed America was
central to this religious struggle. Nathan O. Hatch convincingly argued this point in The Sacred
Cause of Liberty. According to Hatch, “the cycles of republican history, and . . . Christian
eschatology became indivisible,” in the minds of Americans in the latter half of the eighteenth
century.59 If America was to become the location of the prophesied millennial reign of Christ on
earth, the conflict with Catholic conciliators in Great Britain, may have been a sign of the
ultimate triumph of Christ and his true church. Therefore, ministers such as Sherwood, West, and
Cumings applied the Christian eschatological narrative to the political conflict of their time,
assigning this narrative’s opposing roles to the main characters of this conflict. 60
Before independence, American ministers almost always avoided direct criticism of King
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George III from the pulpit. Instead, they blamed Parliament or the British ministry for blinding
the king from the suffering and protestations of his loyal American subjects. Individuals from
these bodies were engaged in an anti-American and pro-Catholic conspiracy and ministers were
unwilling to suggest that the king might be involved. To denounce the king publicly, especially
in a time of political upheaval, was an incredibly serious act. Furthermore, to implicate a
Hanoverian king, the Protestant protector of England, in a Catholic plot had serious implications
beyond the imperial crisis. It is likely that ministers did not criticize the king himself in order to
avoid appearing disloyal or too radical.
Examining how patriot ministers reacted to the Declaration of Independence is especially
enlightening, because it reveals their true convictions concerning the king himself. Independence
radicalized and polarized the conflict with Great Britain. Before July 1776, it was possible to
protest the British government without criticizing the king, but after independence, supporting
the war amounted to open rebellion against not only Parliament and the ministry but also against
King George III himself. There were three degrees of response among those ministers who had
supported American patriots before independence.61
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Some patriot ministers criticized the actions of the British government and even
supported the war before July 1776, but withdrew their support immediately after Congress
declared independence. This was especially true of Anglican ministers who had all made an oath
of loyalty to the British king at the time of their ordination.62 Daniel Batwell, an Anglican bishop
from Virginia, spoke in support of the war before American troops on 20 July 1775. 63 He made it
clear, though, that he gave his support under the impression that the “sole aim” of the
Continental Congress was to recover Americans’ rights and that they had no intention to
establish independence. 64 True to his word, soon after Congress declared independence, he
became an active loyalist.65 Batwell’s actions after independence reveal that he was willing to
support the American patriots only so long as they affirmed their loyalty to George III.66
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Other ministers accepted independence, but never gave their full support. Jacob Duché of
Philadelphia was one of the most vocal and visible proponents among the Anglican clergy of
preserving American liberty. He served as the first chaplain of both the First and Second
Continental Congress and often spoke boldly in support of Congress and the war in his
sermons.67 After independence, he showed his support for the Revolution by omitting the prayers
for George III in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer. 68 Nevertheless, Duché support for
independence waned in the months following July 1776.69 Discouraged by radicals’
wholehearted turn toward independence and the perceived futility of the war after the capture of
Philadelphia, Duché drafted a letter to Washington in October 1777 encouraging him to give up
the cause. What he intended to be a private letter became public, forcing the minister to flee to
England in disgrace. 70
A third group wholeheartedly accepted independence and did not shy away from
implicating the king in the plot to bring Americans under political slavery. There is no one clear
reason why some patriot ministers renounced George III along with so many of their American
compatriots, but the Quebec Act and the dispatch of royal troops against Americans certainly
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eroded their trust in the British monarch. As early as April 1775, Isaac Backus held the king
responsible for the Quebec Act privately in his diary. In giving his consent to the act, Backus
believed, George III had “violated his coronation-oath, which he had solemnly taken before God
and his people.”71 Certainly, the Quebec Act eroded Americans’ trust in the British government
and helped to spread anti-British fervor throughout the colonies. Though many patriot ministers
were reluctant to criticize the king actively before independence, they knew that he had given his
consent to the actions of his government and, therefore, could not escape blame for long.
In the years following independence, this most radical group of patriot religious leaders
began to blame George III in terms even harsher than the language they formally used against his
ministers and Parliament. They looked to biblical accounts that they believed described a
situation similar to their own in order to understand and express their powerful feelings of
betrayal from a king they had once spoken of with great affection and loyalty. 72 Old Testament
accounts of bad kings are abundant, and ministers were drawn to these stories as a justification
for their rejection of royal authority. Therefore, sermons explaining these analogies help to
clarify why so many American ministers ultimately rejected the king. In each case, the characters
of the imperial struggle are fully represented in the accounts of political subjugation in the
history of Israel. These stories feature tyrants who either listened to bad advice or allowed their
counselors to perform oppressive acts in their name. God exacted his righteous revenge in most
cases not on the king’s advisors, but on the wicked king himself. American patriot preachers
argued, therefore, that just as God held evil kings responsible for the actions of their royal
advisors, Americans ought to hold George III responsible for the scheming of his government.
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Whether or not their king was actively involved in a perceived Catholic conspiracy within the
British government, American patriot ministers expected him, as the champion of Protestant
interests in the British Empire, to put an end to the threat.
A good example showing how Old Testament narratives informed American pastors’
interpretation of their political experience is John Lewis’s 1777 sermon, Naboth’s Vineyard.73
Here, Lewis described the story found in I Kings 21 of the wicked King Ahab’s oppression of
one of his subjects. Lewis stated that the purpose of recounting this biblical story was to
remember “acts of ancient tyranny” that “they might be prevented in the future.” 74 He insisted
that there was a clear “parallel betwixt” the biblical account of the tyranny of King Ahab and the
ongoing conflict between Great Britain and America. Like other ministers before and after him,
Lewis assigned the roles of the biblical story to the corresponding characters of his country’s
political narrative and created an analogy that helped him interpret his experience.
I Kings 21 tells the story of Naboth, a subject of King Ahab, who maintained a small
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vineyard close to Ahab’s palace. King Ahab asked Naboth to give him the vineyard in exchange
for a better vineyard or “the worth of it in money.” 75 Naboth refused, saying, “The Lord forbid it
me, that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee.” 76 Ahab was displeased and went
home to brood. His wife, Jezebel, saw him pouting and promised to give Naboth’s vineyard to
her husband. In Ahab’s name, she charged Naboth with “blasphem[ing] God and the king” and
had him stoned to death so that Ahab could take possession of his vineyard. 77
Lewis went on to draw parallels between the characters of the biblical story and the
conflict with Great Britain.78 Naboth represented America, which was “firmly opposing and
rejecting” Great Britain’s persecution. 79 Ahab represented King George III, who, he believed,
was the final instigator of America’s oppression.80 These parallels would be enough to fill a
sermon, but Lewis’s analogy went even deeper. Jezebel, king Ahab’s “most illustrious advisor”
fulfilled the role of George III’s evil ministers who had conspired to destroy American liberty
and impose papal tyranny. 81 Like the executive administration of Great Britain, she carried out
the oppression and murder of Naboth in order to please her king.
Lewis’s analogy might have been enough to implicate only the British ministry. After all,
there is nothing to indicate in the biblical account that King Ahab took direct action or even had
any knowledge of Naboth’s murder. Jezebel carried out the act using Ahab’s name and seal.
75

I Kings 21:2. “And Ahab spake unto Naboth, saying, “Give me thy vineyard, that I may have it for a
garden of herbs, because it is near unto my house: and I will give thee for it a better vineyard than it; or, if it seems
good to thee, I will give thee the worth of it in money.”
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I Kings 21:3.
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I Kings 21:13. The full biblical account of this story is in I Kings 21:1-29.
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Lewis, Naboth’s Vineyard, 11-12. “The comparison,” he wrote, “which might be drawn betwixt our
situation, and the situation of Naboth, is too obvious to be here mentioned.” In this statement, Lewis was referring
directly to Ahab asking Naboth to give him his vineyard rather than to the story as a whole. Still, it is clear from
Naboth’s entire sermon that he expected the analogy to be obvious to his hearers and readers.
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Ibid., 6. This description referred directly to Naboth, but since Lewis made the analogy between Naboth
and America clear, his words here apply to America as well.
80
Lewis took his time in directly stating that Ahab represented King George III himself. Nevertheless, by
the end of his sermon he explicitly stated this analogy. “The present king of Britain – this modern Nero – this
illustrious representation of Ahab . . . has at once thrown off all disguise.” Ibid., 19.
81
Ibid., 15.
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Nevertheless, Lewis insisted that King Ahab (and thus George III) was culpable and ultimately
responsible.
Lewis criticized Ahab for demanding Naboth’s vineyard in the first place. Interpreting
Naboth’s words in his own terms, Lewis gave him a notably Republican voice: “The inheritance
I now possess, my fathers had from God, and not from thee [Ahab]: From them and from the
Almighty I derived it . . . This being the case then, why should I resign it? . . .Notwithstanding
thy exalted rank . . . I will on no account whatever give up mine inheritance.” 82 Naboth was
justified in refusing his king, because his right to defend his property came from God. Ahab had
no right to demand Naboth’s vineyard, because the ownership of property is a right given by God
and not by government.83
George III had demanded American’s property just as Ahab had unjustly demanded
Naboth’s vineyard. Furthermore, Lewis argued that George III was a tyrant not only as bad as
Ahab, but far worse, because he had demanded much more of his American subjects than Ahab
had demanded of Naboth. Great Britain, Lewis argued, was trying to take away “even the great
and glorious inheritance of liberty, by far more precious than all the vineyards upon earth.” 84
George III, “this modern Nero – this illustrious representation of Ahab . . . has . . . had the
insolence and presumption to demand our whole inheritance of us” under threat of violent
destruction. 85
Ahab was responsible for the actions of Jezebel just as King George III was responsible
for the actions of his ministry. Ahab’s selfishness, he believed, fueled and affirmed Jezebel’s
82

Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 11. Ahab, he argued, though he enjoyed every possible luxury, “demand[ed] that small and fertile
vineyard of Naboth – even that vineyard which his forefather had bequeathed to him as his only inheritance.”
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid., 19. This statement is the most intense and direct indictment of King George III in the entire
sermon. Lewis made it clear that he believed the British monarch to be nothing more than “a modern Nero”
determined to destroy America’s wealth and liberty.
83
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cruelty. Lewis insisted that “kings seldom fail of finding counsellors [sic] exactly adapted to
their will, however desperate, bloody or vindictive their measures may be.” 86 What Jezebel did to
Naboth and what the king’s ministers had done to America was the chief sovereign’s fault
because, Lewis insisted, “tools of state, and instruments of tyranny” are extensions of royal
power.87 Lewis demanded that King George III be held exclusively responsible for Great
Britain’s actions because Great Britain’s persecution originated from him. 88 Lewis ended his
sermon by encouraging his audience to stand firm in the confidence that, just as God punished
Ahab for Naboth’s murder,89 God would punish George III and “restore his people once more to
peace and happiness.”90
Henry Cumings offered another excellent example of how American preachers used
biblical analogies to indict King George III in a sermon preached at Lexington in April 1781, the
sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in that town. The main
goal of his sermon echoed his 1775 address. He sought to encourage his readers and listeners
that, although they had experienced many years of warfare and difficulty, God would direct
events for the good of America. Cumings argued that God could use the evil deeds of prideful
and haughty tyrants to produce an outcome that they did not plan for, an outcome that would
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Ibid. Ahab’s cruelty, Lewis concluded, “destroyed but one man” but “his most gracious and most sacred
majesty of Britain is not contented with the death of thousands.”
88
Ibid. “His cruelties (for as they originate from him, his they are) are as such as must disgrace a civilized
being, and . . . even shock a savage.”
89
I Kings 21 describes how God punished Ahab. The prophet Elijah rebuked Ahab using God’s direct
words. Ahab repented of his sin before Elijah, tearing his clothes, fasting, and laying in sackcloth. Because he had
repented, God promised not to “bring the evil in his [Ahab’s] days: but in his son’s days will I bring the evil upon
his house.” I Kings 21:17-29.
90
Lewis, Naboth’s Vineyard, 23. Lewis made an interesting statement at the end of this sermon, which
may indicate that, like many of his contemporaries, he saw America as the last hope of the true Christian church. He
told his audience to go forth “In this hope then, or rather in this confidence” that God would “restore his own people
once more to peace and happiness, if not for their own sakes, yet for the sake of his ever-blessed son, our mediator
and redeemer Christ Jesus.” In this last statement he suggested that God would help America not only to bring
justice to their country, but in order to advance the cause of Christ. For Lewis and other ministers, the cause of the
gospel may have been at stake in the conflict with Great Britain. Ibid., 22-23 (emphasis mine).
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contribute to their own destruction and the good of those they meant to destroy. In order to
solidify this point, Cumings gave many examples throughout Scripture of how God worked
everything for the good of the oppressed and marginalized along with a detailed analysis of the
many ways that God intervened in biblical history. 91
Cumings placed the greatest importance on one scriptural story, the story of Rehoboam
found in 1 Kings 12. He emphasized this passage because it contained close parallels with the
political conflict with Great Britain. 1 Kings 12 contains the scriptural account of Rehoboam’s
rise to the throne after the death of King Solomon and the beginning of a rebellion against his
rule. When Rehoboam became king, the “congregation of Israel” came to him and asked that he
lighten the “heavy yoke” of his father. 92 Before giving his response, Rehoboam sought the advice
of his counselors. The old men who had advised his father recommended that Rehoboam do as
the people asked. 93 Rehoboam did not take their wise advice, but instead took the counsel of “the
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Cumings, A Sermon Preached at Lexington, On the 19th of April, 1781 (Boston: Benjamin Edes & Sons,
1781), 13-19. Cumings listed four ways that God “restrains the wrath of man, and defeats its pernicious devices,
when and so far as he pleases” (15). First, he argued that God sometimes acts by “raising a spirit of fear” to
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with courage and resolution, to oppose and resist, to the utmost, all the mischievous efforts of” their persecutors (1819). Cumings saw himself as a tool for God to use for just this purpose. He sought to inspire his fellow Americans to
continue to resist George III and his oppressive government.
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1 Kings 12:3-4. Presumably, by “heavy yoke,” the Israelites referred to high taxation under Solomon.
Cumings told the story in a language familiar to him and his congregation. 1 Kings 12 described the scene
as if a large group of people, “the congregation of Israel,” came to Rehoboam and literally spoke to him face to face.
Cumings described the scene differently: “the people applied to him, with their petitions, for a redress of
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at Lexington, 11.
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young men that were grown up with him.” 94 They advised that he should not only deny the
people’s request, but make their burden even heavier. When Rehoboam told the people of his
plan, ten of the twelve tribes of Israel rebelled against him. The nation split in two and would not
be reunited for centuries.
Cumings argued that God was working against Rehoboam in order to bring about this
“revolution.”95 1 Kings 12:15 indicates that “the cause was from the Lord,” which meant, in his
view, that the people’s revolt was “agreeable to the will of God.” 96 Cumings spoke in general
terms of God’s ability to turn the wickedness of individuals toward their own destruction and the
greater good of his people.97 Cumings believed that God would do the same for America and
turn the evil actions of King George III and his government toward their good, although early in
the sermon he did not say so explicitly.
Toward the end of his sermon, however, Cumings openly stated the implications of this
story. In a clear transition in the sermon he turned to “an application of what has been said,
adapted to the present occasion.”98 The preacher believed that Rehoboam was a symbol for King
George III, who also took the advice of unwise ministers in ignoring American’s petitions. Just
as God directed the actions of Rehoboam in order to bring about the good of Israel, Cumings
argued that he could “assign this as the reason, why the British king, instead of hearkening to the
cries and prayers of his loyal subjects in America, should either treat their complaints and
petitions with neglect, or answer them only with insult and additional injuries . . . .”99 George III,
like Rehoboam was “blinded” by his ambition and took action that forced a revolt of his loyal
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Ibid.
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subjects, who only wanted to serve him with dignity and respect.100 The British monarch, in the
same way as Rehoboam, followed the counsel of his foolish advisers, because their advice was in
line with his own ambition. George III, therefore, was the immediate cause of the revolt. If he
had acted differently, Cumings was convinced, America would have reconciled with Great
Britain. In the end, the blame was entirely on the king’s shoulders.
The political protest of many patriot ministers, not unlike politicians and planters,
changed from a focus on the actions of Parliament and the British ministry to a full-fledged
rejection of King George III as their sovereign king. Throughout their journey, their
contemporary experience, their understanding of the British past, and analogies from biblical
stories shaped their decisions. Great Britain’s tendency to come under the tyrannical influence of
Catholic oppression as told in British history coupled with the signs of oppression that marked
their own time, convinced many ministers that a conspiracy had formed in their imperial
government to destroy American liberty and reestablish popery throughout the British Empire.
Even scriptural prophecy seemed to point to the corruption of the British government and the
inevitable persecution of Protestant America. As their suspicions grew, many patriot ministers
avoided implicating the king in this plot. Nevertheless, the king’s refusal to hear American’s
petitions and his failure to restrain his corrupt ministers eventually led to their rejection of his
authority, especially after independence. When they denied the king himself and embraced
America as a separate and sovereign nation, ministers looked to Scripture as both a justification
for and a means of expressing the renunciation of their former monarch.
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Ibid. Cumings insisted that Americans did not wish to bring about their own independence before the
outbreak of war. “Had our petitions and prayer been properly regarded,” he argued, “and moderate pacific measures
pursued, we should have entertained no thoughts of a revolt; for even after hostilities had commenced, we were
ardently desirous of continuing united with our mother country, if such an union could have been preserved, without
making a sacrifice of our liberties.” Ibid.
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Conclusion

Four years after the Declaration of Independence, Samuel Cooper gave a sermon on the
day of the “Commencement of the constitution” of Massachusetts. 1 He urged Americans not to
look back to their monarchical roots but instead embrace the new republic, which they had built
for themselves and which they still fought to establish. He looked to the example of the nation of
Israel, who after the Babylonian captivity, returned to their homeland and did not reestablish a
monarchical form of government, which had led to their oppression and suffering. Instead,
Cooper argued, they established a republic. The people of Israel elected “men of principal
character and influence . . . to conduct their affairs.”2 These leaders would find their authority not
through arbitrary inheritance but, as according the prophet Jeremiah, they were to be elected
representatives arising out of the body of the people. 3 Just as Israel, after her time of suffering,
did not establish a new monarchy in their land, so America, Cooper urged his fellow
countrymen, after she escaped from monarchical oppression, should embrace a new form of
government.
Cooper’s sermon reveals one of the most important implications of the American
Revolution. The renunciation of George III as America’s sovereign resulted in much more than
American independence. Indeed, it marked a radical shift in America’s culture. The American
Revolution represents the great transition of how a monarchical America became a republic
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Samuel Cooper, A Sermon Preached Before His Excellency John Hancock, Esq. . . . Being the Day of the
Commencement of the constitution and Inauguration of the New Government, in Political Sermons of the American
Founding Era: 1730-1805, ed., Ellis Sandoz (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998), 1:629.
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Ibid., 633.
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Ibid. Cooper quoted from Jeremiah 30:21: “And their nobles shall be of themselves, and their governor
shall proceed from the midst of them; and I will cause him to draw near, and he shall approach unto me: for who is
this that engaged his heart to approach unto me? saith the Lord.” Jer. 30:21.
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increasingly based on equality.4 The experience of Americans with the British government
helped to ensure that America could no longer operate under the authority of a hereditary
monarch. As different groups of individuals moved from protesting parliamentary authority to
criticizing the king’s ministers and ultimately rejecting King George III himself, they set in
motion a series of events that would make the budding nation unique in the world.
Understanding the reasons why Americans rejected royal authority during the revolutionary era,
then, is vital, because it brings greater clarity to Americans’ decisions in succeeding decades.
The motivations of those who embraced independence, though, were not uniform,
precisely because Americans’ individualized experiences during the Revolutionary era were also
not uniform. Different groups of people rejected the king for different reasons, because their
perceptions of the king’s responsibilities were as diverse as the people that made up America.
For Continental Congress, the king’s own words, and more importantly the delegates’
perception of the meaning of those words, convinced them that reconciliation was impossible
and independence was the only option available to secure American liberty. The First
Continental Congress met in Philadelphia beginning in September 1774 to convince George III
“to recommend to his parliament of Great Britain the total revocation” of the acts they believed
were suppressing Americans’ rights as Englishmen.5 They wanted him to stand between them
and Parliament to protect them from the oppression of a body that they believed exercised no
legitimate authority over them. Even after the outbreak of war, they continued to see him as their
protector, blaming the king’s ministers rather than the king himself for executive actions against
4

Gordon Wood’s classic work, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, argues this point. The idea of
equality, which arose out of revolutionary rhetoric, Wood said, “was the most radical and most powerful ideological
force let loose in the Revolution.” The words of equality resulted in an unintended consequence of the Revolution,
the breakdown of hard distinctions between social classes in America. The Revolution went far beyond the
founders’ intentions as Americans began to see the world differently. No man, despite their education or talent, was
truly better than anyone else. This change in American culture manifested in every institution. Wood, The
Radicalism of the American Revolution, 5, 232.
5
Jefferson, “A Summary View,” 16.
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America. Nevertheless, their loyalty did not last. A series of speeches and proclamations from
the king convinced them that he would not heed their petitions and in fact was the leader of a
plot to destroy American liberty. The delegates of Congress operated in the world of politics, and
in this world, words are often more informative than deeds. Their unique experience as leading
politicians led them to reject the king, because he chose to use his influential voice to encourage
rather than discourage their persecution.
In the South, the daily lives of many planters involved the task of managing the daily
operations of their plantation kingdoms. The role they played as a ruler over their slaves
informed how they believed their kingly ruler should govern his subjects. They believed they had
a duty to ensure that they heard their slaves’ complaints of mistreatment and that they always
acted for the justice of their people. If they ensured this service to their slaves, they expected the
same of their own superiors, right up to the king himself. In the same way, then, they expected
George III to hear Americans’ protestations and act justly. When the weight of events made it
clear that he would not act on their behalf, planters rejected him as an incompetent ruler, no more
fit to run a plantation than an empire.
As many Southern planters judged the king by his competency as an impartial judge in
the imperial conflict, patriot religious leaders expected their king to fulfill the role of a Protestant
protector. American ministers constructed their relationship with their king based on the role of
Protestantism in English history and the teachings of Scripture. The religious motivations of the
Glorious Revolution tied the Protestant mission to the image of the post-Stuart monarchs in the
British Empire. Not only did they hold him responsible to advance the Protestant cause
throughout the world, but also that he should block any encroachment of Catholic influence in
English society or government. With this in mind, many American pastors became convinced
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that a Catholic conspiracy had arisen among the British ministry. They believed this conspiracy,
as evidenced by the Quebec Act, planned to destroy not only Americans’ political freedoms but
also their cherished religious liberty. When George III failed to bring justice to his Protestant
kingdom, the most radical patriot ministers rejected him as an unfit protector of Protestant
interests. They turned to the lessons of Old Testament narratives as a guide. There they found
that God held wicked kings responsible for not only their own unjust actions but also the actions
of their advisors. They used the Bible both to reject royal authority and rally Americans to the
patriot cause.
These three groups of Americans, viewing the world through the lenses of their own
unique experiences, lost faith in the king’s authority at different times and for different reasons.
Nevertheless, the process that politicians, planters, and ministers underwent was remarkably
similar. Patriots in each of these groups all began by protesting the authority of Parliament and
the actions of the British ministry. Throughout their protest, they protected their political and
emotional connection to the monarchy. At different times and for different reasons, however, the
object of their protest shifted dramatically against the king himself after a perceived betrayal on
the part of George III eroded their affection and loyalty. Many Americans within each group
believed that the king either refused or failed to protect them from forces within the British
government intent on harming Americans. This led them to sever ties with the monarchy and
ultimately the entire British government.
Politicians, planters, and pastors characterized their initial protest based on their unique
experiences, but for all of them, the king’s betrayal was the root cause of the turn toward
independence. The early stages of the imperial crisis arose out of a variety of political or
economic causes, but the decision for independence was by-in-large emotionally driven.
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Ultimately, America became an independent nation, not solely out of a disagreement concerning
politics or economics, but because of a sudden breakdown in the intimate relationship between
Americans and their king.
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